The Time Series Consumption Function Revisited by Alan S. Blinder & Angus Deaton
ALAN  S.  BLINDER 
Brookings Institution and Princeton  University 
ANGUS  DEATON 
Princeton  University 
The  Time  Series  Consumption 
Function  Revisited 
THE  RELATIONSHIP  between  consumer spending and income is one of the 
oldest statistical  regularities  of macroeconomics-and one of the stur- 
diest. Like the aging movie star, it needs a little touching  up now and 
again,  but always seems to come bouncing  back. 
A dozen  years  ago, both  the  theoretical  derivation  and  the  econometric 
form of the aggregate  consumption  function were considered settled. 
Most economists adhered  to one of two ways of putting  Fisher's theory 
of intertemporal  optimization  into operation:  Milton Friedman's  per- 
manent income hypothesis (henceforth, PIH) or Franco Modigliani's 
life-cycle hypothesis  (henceforth,  LCH).  ' Since each variant  seemed to 
have sound theoretical underpinnings,  and since the two had similar 
econometric  forms  that  explained  the data  well and had similar  implica- 
tions for policy, there  was not a great  deal to quarrel  about. Perhaps  the 
most contentious empirical issue was the apparently  large marginal 
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propensity  to consume out of transitory  income, which was variously 
explained by a "short horizon" (that is, a high discount rate) or by 
liquidity  constraints. 
Things  are quite  different  now. Developments  in economic research, 
as well as actual events, have raised fundamental  questions about the 
consumption  function.  At the same time, the range  of experience of the 
last dozen years has been great enough to hold out the hope of getting 
some answers  from  aggregate  data.  This seems, therefore,  an auspicious 
time to take a fresh, and unabashedly  empirical,  look at the time series 
consumption  function. 
Questions Raised by Modern Research 
The  Lucas Critique. Reasons abound  for questioning  the traditional 
consumption  function and its implications  for how tax policy affects 
consumer  spending.  Robert  Lucas has pointed out that, under  rational 
expectations, the PIH does not lead to a  "structural" relationship 
between  consumption  and  income, but  rather  to a statistical  relationship 
that should  change  whenever  the stochastic process generating  income 
changes. The Lucas critique calls for estimation methods that treat 
consumption  and  income  jointly.2 
The "Random Walk" Hypothesis.  Robert Hall sharpened the impli- 
cations of the PIH by showing  that  the rational  expectations  hypothesis 
implies  that  only "surprises"  in permanent  income should  affect  current 
consumption,  once lagged  consumption  is controlled  for.3 
The work of Hall and Lucas added a new dichotomy-that between 
anticipated and unanticipated  changes in income-to  the traditional 
permanent-transitory  dichotomy. It is this new dichotomy, rather  than 
the  old one, that  has  absorbed  the  attention  of contemporary  researchers. 
Hall's work in particular  has spawned an infant industry estimating 
Euler equations  linking  current  and lagged  consumption  in the manner 
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implied  by the first-order  conditions  of a Fisherian  intertemporal  opti- 
mization  problem.  We have our doubts about the wisdom of modeling 
aggregate  consumption  as the interior  solution to a single individual's 
optimization  problem  in adjacent  periods,4  but  in any case think  it fair  to 
say that the research  done to date has not supported  the econometric 
restrictions  implied  by the Euler equation approach.  Nor has further 
investigation  validated  the hypothesis  that  the response  of consumption 
to income (henceforth, Y) reflects only the usefulness of current Y in 
predicting  future  Y.  Instead,  research  typically  finds  "excess sensitivity" 
to current  income.' But the case is by no means closed. So a central 
question  of this study is whether  information  known at time t -  1, such 
as anticipated  income, has any predictive power for changes in con- 
sumption between times t -  1  and t. 
The Barro Equivalence  Hypothesis.  A rather different objection  to 
standard  consumption  functions, based on the idea that private and 
government  accounts should be consolidated, was raised by Robert 
Barro.6  The income (that is, disposable income) and wealth (that is, 
household net worth, including  government  debt) variables normally 
used in consumption  functions imply that intertemporal  shifts in the 
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pattern  of taxes, with no change  in their  present  value, produce  shifts  in 
the time pattern  of consumption.  This should  not be so, Barro  argued,  if 
people can freely transfer  income across generations. 
The Barro  equivalence hypothesis is not theoretically  unobjection- 
able. In addition to the usual perfect capital markets assumption, it 
requires  that bequests be motivated  by intergenerational  altruism  and 
that  people  have  extremely  long  time  horizons.  It  also has  trouble  dealing 
with childless people or with the possibility of "corner solutions" in 
which the unconstrained  optimal  bequest  cannot  be enforced  because it 
is negative.  Because of these and  other  problems,  many  economists  find 
the equivalence  hypothesis  implausible  on a priori  grounds.  But a priori 
reasoning  is not the way to settle the issue, and empirical  studies have 
found  it surprisingly  difficult  to reject  the equivalence  hypothesis.7  More 
evidence would  be welcome, and  we try to obtain  some below. 
Intertemporal  Substitution.  Modern  macroeconomic  analysis  has 
reemphasized intertemporal  substitution. Yet standard  consumption 
functions  often omit  the rate  of interest  as an argument-not on theoret- 
ical grounds,  but on empirical  grounds.  The consensus conclusion that 
consumption,  and hence saving, is insensitive to the rate of return  has 
been questioned  by Michael  Boskin and, more recently, by Lawrence 
Summers.8  What  do recent  data say about  this issue? 
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Questions Raised by Recent Events 
Temporary  Tax  Changes. The pure  PIH  with no liquidity  constraints 
predicts  that  people  will react  much  less to temporary  than  to permanent 
changes in taxes. And in 1968, when a temporary  tax surcharge  was 
imposed, consumption  did indeed decline less than simple Keynesian 
consumption  functions predicted. Similarly,  a temporary  tax decrease 
in 1975  led to a strong surge in saving, but only a modest increase in 
consumption. In the aftermath of these two episodes, both casual 
observation of the facts and formal econometric research seemed to 
support  a modified  version of the PIH.9  But this inference  rested on a 
slender  data  base. 
Recent events have given us another  episode. Since the Reagan  tax 
cuts of 1981-84  came in three  preannounced  stages, they can be thought 
of as a permanent  tax reduction  in August  1981  coupled  with  a temporary 
tax increase of gradually  diminishing  size. Thus the PIH predicts that 
saving  should  have declined  sharply  after  August 1981  as the scheduled 
permanent  tax cut induced  higher  consumption.  Did it? 
To answer this question we must, at a minimum,  adjust  the data for 
the sharp  business  cycle that  took place during  this period,  for even very 
weak  versions  of the PIH  imply  that  saving  rates  should  fall  in  downturns 
and rise in booms. Table 1 shows cyclically adjusted  saving rates for 
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Table 1.  Cyclically Adjusted Net Saving as a Percentage of Net National Product, 
1971  84a 
1971-80 
Sector  average  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984 
1.  Government  -1.7  -1.4  -1.2  -  2.3  -  3.4  -4.6 
2.  Personal  5.5  4.5  5.5  5.2  5.0  5.9 
3.  Business  (net)  2.5  2.1  1.9  2.3  2.9  2.7 
4.  Total private (2+3)  8.0  6.6  7.4  7.5  7.8  8.6 
5.  National  (1+2+3)  6.3  5.2  6.2  5.2  4.4  4.0 
a.  Cyclical  adjustment is based on regressions  of particular saving rates on time, the unemployment  rate, and the 
change in the unemployment  rate. The coefficients  of the unemployment  rate that are used to do cyclical  adjustment 
are as follows  (with t-statistics  in parentheses): 
Item  Government  Personal  Business  Private  National 
Level  of unemployment  rate  -0.76  -0.25  -0.08  -0.33  -1.09 
(-5.2)  (-2.4)  (-0.8)  (-2.4)  (-8.5) 
Change in unemployment  rate  -0.17  0.37  -0.46  -0.09  -0.26 
(-1.1)  (3.4)  (-4.1)  (-0.6)  (-1.9) 
persons (households), businesses, and government  on average  for the 
period  1971-80  and then  annually  for  1980-84.10  These  data do  not 
suggest that the saving rate dropped  after the 1981  tax act was passed. 
As cyclically adjusted government dissaving rose steadily from 1.2 
percent  of net national  product  (NNP) in 1981  to 4.6 percent  of NNP in 
1984,  the cyclically  adjusted  personal  saving  rate  did  fall slightly  in 1982 
and 1983.  But the adjusted  rate of net business saving  rose by more, so 
that, if households "see through  the corporate veil" by treating the 
retained earnings of corporations as their own, the relevant saving 
concept (total private saving) actually increased slightly in 1982 and 
1983.  But a simple  look at the data is not the proper  way to answer the 
question.  We need  to study  whether  consumers'  reactions  to the Reagan 
"temporary  tax increases" were consistent with their  behavior  in 1968 
and 1975. 
Interest Rates  and Inflation.  Recent policy  initiatives have focused 
attention  anew on the sensitivity  of saving  to the after-tax  rate  of return. 
Until a decade ago, the relatively small variance in the after-tax  real 
interest  rate  made  inferences  about  the  interest  elasticity  of consumption 
10. Cyclical  adjustment  was  performed  by  first  estimating  annual  ordinary  least  squares 
(OLS) regressions  of the form: s,  =  a  +  bt +  cU,  +  d[U,  -  U,  I] +  e, over the period 
1954-84. Here s is any of the net saving rates listed in the table, U is the civilian 
unemployment  rate, and t is time. The estimates  of the coefficients  c and d were used to 
compute  cyclically  adjusted  saving  rates,  that  is, the saving  rates  that  would  have  occurred 
if actual  U had  been  equal  to Robert  Gordon's  estimate  of the natural  rate  of unemployment 
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tenuous at best.1"  Recent years, with their unprecedentedly  high and 
volatile real after-tax  interest rates, have remedied that problem and 
should permit sharper inferences both about interest sensitivity and 
about any direct effects that inflation  might have on consumption. In 
particular,  several years ago, Deaton suggested that the apparent  de- 
pressing  effect of inflation  on consumption  might  be due to the fact that 
shoppers  mistake  nominal  price increases  for real  price increases when 
inflation  is unanticipated.  12 
Budget  Deficits.  The Barro hypothesis, which says (roughly)  that 
government  spending  should  replace  taxes in the definition  of disposable 
income,  was  also  difficult  to test until  recently  because  cyclically  adjusted 
budget  deficits  were small  and varied  little, except during  wars. Recent 
events have  changed  that.  If Barro  is right,  private  saving-and probably 
personal  saving-should have  risen  dramatically  to counteract  the  effects 
of government dissaving. Instead, table 1 shows that the cyclically 
adjusted  personal saving rate rose by only 0.4 of a percentage  point 
between 1981  and 1984, while the cyclically adjusted  government  dis- 
saving rate rose by 3.4 percentage  points. If we look more broadly  at 
total  private  saving,  13 the rise in the cyclically  adjusted  saving  rate  is still 
only  1.2  percentage points-about  one-third of  the  decline  in 
government  saving. Thus, on quick inspection, the data appear  hostile 
to Barro's  hypothesis:  as the government  deficit  increased,  net national 
saving  fell from  6.2 percent  of NNP (close to the average  of the previous 
decade) in 1981  to only 4 percent  of NNP (the lowest level in the 1954- 
84 period)  in 1984.  But, once again, a more serious econometric  inves- 
tigation  is in order. 
Plan of the Paper 
It has become traditional  to divide  aggregate  consumer  spending  into 
two components:  purchases  of nondurable  goods and services, Ct, and 
11. Eugene  Fama,.  "Short-Term  Interest  Rates as Predictors  of Inflation,"  American 
Economic Review, vol. 65 (June  1975), pp. 269-82. 
12. See Angus S. Deaton, "Involuntary  Saving through  Unanticipated  Inflation," 
Ametican Economic Review, vol. 67 (December  1977),  pp. 899-910. 
13. The  equivalence  hypothesis,  it seems  to us, suggests  that  a decrease  in  government 
saving  should  be offset by an increase  in personal  saving. But if households  not only see 
through  the corporate  veil but actually  reach through  it and get corporations  to do their 
bidding,  then  business  saving  could  offset the government's  actions.  That  is why we look 
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purchases  of durables.  Modern  research  on the consumption  function 
has  focused on the former  and  typically  has modeled  Ct  in isolation  from 
purchases  of durables.  An alternative  procedure  is to work  with the sum 
of the flow of services from  durable  goods and purchases  of nondurable 
goods and services. We adopt instead a middle  position in which each 
component is treated separately, but relative price effects potentially 
matter, as they would in a system of demand equations. To facilitate 
comparison  with the recent literature,  and because modeling  expendi- 
tures on durables  presents  a host of special  problems,  the present  paper 
deals only with nondurable  goods and services. 
We begin by developing  a baseline consumption  function  for Ct  that 
includes as arguments such standard variables as income, wealth, 
interest rates, relative prices, and inflation. We use this function to 
address  a variety  of basic questions. Is there any point in decomposing 
income changes and other variables  into anticipated  and unanticipated 
components,  or  is the  traditional  specification  that  ignores  this  distinction 
adequate?  Is it only surprise  changes  in variables  like income  and  wealth 
that matter? Is consumption sensitive either to interest rates or to 
inflation?  Are there detectable relative price effects? Has consumer 
behavior  changed  during  the Reagan  years? 
Next, we consider  various  ways to augment  the baseline  specification 
in order to test some more controversial  hypotheses. Are permanent 
and temporary  tax changes treated differently by consumers? Is the 
Barro  equivalence  hypothesis supported?  The last section summarizes 
what we think  we have learned. 
A Basic Consumption  Function 
THE  DATA 
For purposes  of this study, which covers the period 1954:1  to 1984:4, 
we  make four changes in the official national income and product 
accounts (NIPA)  data. 
First, we remove the 1975  tax rebate  from the income data until we 
are ready to deal explicitly with the temporary  tax issue. We do this so 
as not to allow the 1975:2  observation  to exert undue influence  on our 
baseline specification,  for the raw data show a stunning  23.8 percent Alan S. Blinder and Angus Deaton  473 
annual  growth  rate of real disposable income in 1975:2,  followed by a 
5.7 percent annual rate of decline in 1975:3. 
Second, the NIPA include gross interest payments  from businesses 
to individuals  (for example, on corporate  bonds) in personal income, 
and hence in disposable  income, without  netting  out interest  payments 
from individuals  to businesses (for example, for consumer  credit). But 
the tax system essentially nets one against the other and levies taxes 
only on net interest received. So we subtracted  interest paid by con- 
sumers to businesses from the NIPA definition  of disposable income. 
This change  lowers Y  slightly  without  affecting  C. 14 
Third,  in the NIPA, personal "nontax payments" are grouped  with 
personal  taxes. A closer examination  of this category  reveals that such 
things as tuition payments to  state colleges and fees  collected by 
government  hospitals are part of state and local "nontax payments." 
Because these items seem more accurately  classified as personal con- 
sumption,  not as taxes, we adjusted  the national  accounts  by subtracting 
state and  local nontax  payments,  which totaled  $46  billion  in 1984,  from 
taxes and  from  government  purchases  and  adding  them  to consumption. 
In doing so, we deflated  state and local nontax  payments  by the NIPA 
deflator  for consumption  of services. This adjustment  raises C and Y 
equally  without  changing  the government  deficit. 
Fourth, since expenditures  on durable  goods and expenditures on 
nondurables  and  services almost  certainly  require  different  econometric 
explanations,  they also require  some classification  scheme. We  followed 
the official  U.S. Bureau  of Economic  Analysis  (BEA)  classification  with 
one exception-we  reclassified  clothing  and  shoes, which  are  nondurable 
goods according  to NIPA, as durables. 
The resulting series on real purchases of nondurable  goods and 
services, when put  on a per capita  basis, became  the basic variable  to be 
studied  and  is henceforth  denoted  by C. 15 
14. The NIPA count interest paid as part  of "personal  outlays," but not as part  of 
"personal  consumption  expenditures."  The adjustment  we make is not a big one. For 
example,  in 1984  interest  paid  amounted  to $78  billion,  while  disposable  income  was $2,577 
billion. 
15. All series are seasonally  adjusted.  We used total population  in making  per capita 
conversions.  Our  implied  deflator  for total consumer  spending  (henceforth  P), which  we 
use to deflate  our version  of disposable  income, differs  trivially  from the NIPA deflator 
because  the two definitions  of total  consumer  spending  differ  slightly. 474  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
FUNCTIONAL  FORM  AND  ESTIMATION  ISSUES 
While  the permanent  income model perhaps  leads more naturally  to 
a linear  relationship  between  consumption  and some concept of income, 
we adopt a logarithmic  specification  here. We do not believe that any 
important  results  are sensitive to the choice between  linear  and  logarith- 
mic form. But since we are interested in studying several price-like 
variables, such as interest  rates, the logarithmic  form is convenient in 
that it avoids the need for numerous  interaction  terms to allow all the 
coefficients  to depend,  for example,  on the interest  rate. In addition,  the 
modern Euler-equation  or "surprise" consumption  functions that we 
wish.to study  predict  that, in the absence of new information,  consump- 
tion grows from period  to period  at a rate that depends on the real rate 
of interest. Once again, this is most easily modeled using a logarithmic 
specification. 
We do not, however, work with the currently fashionable "first 
differences only" specification, because differencing obliterates the 
single most striking  characteristic  of the time series-the  remarkable 
constancy  of the C/Yratio-and therefore  is silent  about  the steady-state 
properties  of the system. Instead  we attempt  to capture  both the short- 
run dynamics and the long-run  properties  of the consumption-income 
relationship  by adopting  a flexible  distributed  lag model that accommo- 
dates, or "nests," many of the specifications  that have been discussed 
in the literature-including both "Euler-type" specifications  and the 
error-correction  model that has been much recommended  by David 
Hendry  and several  collaborators  in the United Kingdom.  16 
Specifically,  our  basic functional  form  is: 
(1)  ACt  =  PO  +  PIct-I  +  12Yt  +  33Yt-l +  qt8  +  Zt-1y +  ut, 
where  c and  y denote  the natural  logarithms  of consumption  and  income. 
In addition to income, there are two types of right-hand  variables in 
equation  1. The q variables  are contemporaneously  dated  variables  like 
16. James  E.H. Davidson,  David F. Hendry,  Frank  Srba,  and Stephen  Yeo, "Econ- 
ometric Modelling of  the Aggregate Time-Series Relationship  between Consumers' 
Expenditure  and Income  in the U.K.," Economic  Journal,  vol. 88 (December  1978),  pp. 
661-92. Alan S. Blinder and Angus Deaton  475 
wealth, inflation,  and  relative  prices. The zt_ variables  are either  lagged 
values  of q variables  or other  variables  that  are known  at time t -  1  (such 
as a time trend). The list of z and q variables  changes as we examine 
various  hypotheses  during  the course of the paper. 
Whenever  we estimate a version of equation 1, we also estimate an 
augmented  specification  that decomposes y and q into anticipated  and 
unanticipated  components,  namely: 
(2)  z\c, =  PO  +  I3ct1 +  32EYt  +  3P*(yt-Eyt) 
+  Eqt8  +  (qt -  Eqt)8*  +  Zt-ly  +  Ut. 
We do this for two reasons. The first is to test the "surprises only" 
prediction  of the pure PIH without liquidity constraints, that is, the 
implication that changes in consumption from t -1  to  t  should be 
independent  of information  about  income and  wealth  that  was available 
at time t -  1. We perform  this test by dropping  lagged  consumption  from 
the right-hand  side of equation  2, re-estimating  the equation,  and then 
testing whether the coefficients on anticipated  and lagged income and 
wealth are zero.17 This test is precisely the "excess sensitivity" test 
carried  out by Marjorie  Flavin and others, adapted  to a more elaborate 
specification.  18 
The second reason for decomposing  all contemporaneous  variables 
into anticipated  and unanticipated  components is econometric. The 
current  value of a q variable  (for example, the relative  price of durable 
goods) might have a well-defined  theoretical  role in the consumption 
function. But in addition, the "news" contained in any contempora- 
neously  dated  variable  might  induce  consumers  to revise their  estimates 
of permanent  income, and  thus  to change  their  consumption.  If so, these 
variables  will be correlated  with the change  in consumption  for reasons 
17. This  test is sensitive  to assumptions  about  the  presence  of transitory  consumption. 
If transitory  consumption  is important,  the  differenced  equation  will  have  moving  average 
residuals,  in which  case inclusion  of lagged  c will yield inconsistent  estimates,  and even 
without  lagged  c, the serial  correlation  will  invalidate  the standard  test statistics.  However, 
we found  no evidence  of serial  correlation  whether  or not lagged  c was included  (which  is 
itself evidence against  the pure  PIH), so we have no reason to doubt  the validity  of our 
test statistics.  Since  c,  appears  to be important  in several  of the regressions,  we suppress 
it only to make  our tests comparable  with those in the literature;  test statistics  when c, 
is included  are  much  less favorable  to the surprises-only  hypothesis. 
18. See Flavin,  "The  Adjustment  of Consumption." 476  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
having nothing to do with their inherent roles in the consumption 
function,  such as the substitution  effects of relative  prices. The problem 
is solved by constructing  instrumental  variables  for the q variables  from 
first-stage  regressions  using  data  dated  t -  1  and  earlier.  This amounts  to 
replacing  each q by its "anticipated"  value. We then allow separately 
for the effects of the unanticipated  q variables  by including  them in the 
regressions  as well. 
Estimation of equation 2 requires a way to deal with unobserved 
expectations. As just suggested, we adopt the now standard  method  of 
generating expectations as  the one-period-ahead  forecasts from an 
estimated  vector autoregression  (VAR)  for the variables  y and q: 
(3)  (Y)  = AV,  +  et. 
Here the vector Vt  -I includes two lags each of c, y, and every variable 
in q, plus all the zt_  I  variables  and  a quadratic  time trend.  The expected 
component  is the predicted  value. The unanticipated  component  is the 
series et. 
The VAR equations themselves are of limited interest and change 
every time we alter the specification  of z and q; hence they are not 
reported. However, since the unanticipated,  or "surprise," variables 
generated  by these equations  play a major  role in our analysis, a little 
description  is in order.  The VAR equations  fit  the data  quite  well, so that 
most  of the variance  ofy and  q is classified  as "anticipated"  (for  example, 
R2  for  income  exceeds 0.99). All the variables  are  strongly  autoregressive 
(generally  of second order),  and, in addition,  the stock of durable  goods 
helps  predict  both  income  and  inflation,  the nominal  rate  of interest  helps 
predict  wealth, and time helps predict inflation.  The appendix  reports 
the "data"  on anticipated  and  unanticipated  changes  of income, wealth, 
and inflation  generated by one important  version of the model. The 
simple correlations  between the actual changes and the surprises  are 
0.76, 0.66, and  0.74 for income, wealth, and  inflation,  respectively. 
After the VARs are estimated  by ordinary  least squares  (OLS) and 
used to create anticipated  and unanticipated  series, equation  2 is esti- 
mated  by OLS. This simple  two-step  procedure  has much  to recommend 
it over more complicated  one-step procedures  that treat  equation  2 and 
equation  3 as a system. First, it is simpler  computationally.  Second, the 
estimated coefficients in equation 2, the equation  of interest, are less Alan S. Blinder and Angus Deaton  477 
contaminated  by specification  errors  in auxiliary  equation  3.19  However, 
the  two-step  procedure  does not  yield  correct  estimates  of all  the standard 
errors, because it treats the anticipated  and unanticipated  variables  as 
known data, rather  than as the statistical  estimates that they are. The 
standard  errors  for the coefficients of surprise  variables  are correct as 
calculated  by OLS. But standard  errors  for the other coefficients must 
be obtained  from  a two-stage  least squares  (2SLS)  regression  that  omits 
the surprise  terms  and  uses the VAR as the first  stage.20 
In applied econometrics, as in life, you rarely get something for 
nothing.  Some assumptions  must be made in order  to identify  a system 
like  equation  2 and  equation  3. Our  main  identifying,  and  thus  untestable, 
assumption  is that transitory  consumption,  that is, the disturbance  in 
equation  2, is orthogonal  to the surprises  in  income  and  in  other  variables, 
that  is, to the disturbances,  et, in equation  3. While  this assumption  can 
certainly be  questioned, it is  far weaker than Friedman's original 
assumption that transitory income and transitory consumption are 
uncorrelated-because an income surprise  does lead directly  to a con- 
sumption  surprise  according  to equation  2.21 
Note also that the estimated  coefficients  of the no-surprise  variables 
in equation  2 are precisely those that would be produced  by estimating 
equation 1 by 2SLS. Put differently,  the surprise  model (equation  2) is 
observationally  equivalent to the traditional  model (equation 1) with 
simultaneity  affecting y and q. A model with both simultaneity  and 
surprises  is therefore  not identifiable;  the reader,  like the authors,  must 
choose one interpretation  or  the other.22  Throughout  the paper,  we adopt 
the surprise interpretation.  But readers preferring  the simultaneity 
interpretation  can disregard  the coefficients of the surprise  variables 
19. This is just the standard  argument  for favoring limited-information  over full- 
information  methods. 
20. See Adrian Pagan, "Econometric  Issues in the Analysis of Regressions with 
Generated Regressors,"  International  Economic  Review,  vol.  25 (February  1984), pp. 
221-48. 
21. Flavin, in "The Adjustment  of Consumption,"  identifies  the model instead by 
assuming  a value  for  the coefficient  of unanticipated  income  in equation  2, a procedure  we 
do not find  appealing. 
22. Robert  Hall,  in "The  Role of Consumption  in Economic  Fluctuations,"  in Robert 
J. Gordon,  ed., The  American  Business  Cycle  (University  of Chicago  Press,  forthcoming), 
explores the possibility  of estimating  (a very parsimonious)  consumption  function  with 
minimal  use of exogeneity assumptions.  See also the comments  by Deaton that follow 
Hall's  paper. 478  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
in equation  2 and  treat  the other  coefficients  as 2SLS estimates  of equa- 
tion 1. 
For  each  pair  of regressions,  we routinely  carried  out  a set of diagnostic 
tests. First, in addition  to the Durbin-Watson  statistic, which is biased 
against finding  serial correlation  owing to the presence of the lagged 
dependent  variable, and the Box-Pierce Q statistic, we constructed a 
version of the Lagrange  multiplier  test for serial  correlation  up to order 
four. In none of the regressions  was there  ever the slightest  hint  of serial 
correlation,  so we refrain  from reporting  all these test statistics. This 
finding  is of some interest,  however, since the pure  PIH implies  that  the 
error  term should be serially correlated  (see footnote 17). Second, we 
report the results of Chow stability tests over the two halves of the 
sample and across the Reagan subperiod, 1981:3  to 1984:4;  marginal 
significance  levels for rejecting  parameter  stability are labeled "half- 
sample  stability"  and "Reagan  stability"  in the tables. Except in a few 
cases to be noted  below, parameter  stability  could not be rejected. 
In addition  to these diagnostics,  we report  tests of two more  econom- 
ically interesting  hypotheses. First, we always test the hypothesis that 
the long-run  elasticity  of consumption  with respect to income  is unity- 
something  that is not obviously contradicted  by the raw data. Second, 
in all regressions  that  include  the rate  of interest,  we test the hypothesis 
that  only the real rate  of interest  matters,  that  is, that  the nominal  after- 
tax interest rate and expected inflation  (or actual inflation  in the no- 
surprise  regressions)  have equal  and  opposite coefficients. 
A final  set of tests pertains  to the validity  of the pure PIH and to the 
value of decomposing variables  into anticipated  and surprise  compo- 
nents. The hypothesis called "no decomposition" in the tables is that 
the coefficients  of all anticipated  and unanticipated  variables  are equal, 
so that  only actual  variables  matter,  that  is, the hypothesis  that  equation 
2 can be reduced  to equation  1. Since the PIH suggests so strongly  that 
anticipated  and unanticipated  income and wealth should get different 
coefficients,  we next test the weaker  hypothesis  that  the decomposition 
is irrelevant  only for these two variables,  leaving  other  variables  uncon- 
strained.23  Finally, we  test  the  surprises-only hypothesis that was 
23. Robert Hall pointed  out at the September  1985  meeting  of the Brookings  Panel 
that, under some circumstances,  the pure PIH is fully consistent with our no-surprise 
specification.  Specifically,  if income  follows a first-order  autoregressive  process, then  y, 
is the only variable  relevant  to predicting  future  y variables.  The appearance  of lagged Alan S. Blinder and Angus Deaton  479 
described  earlier, the hypothesis that lagged and anticipated  values of 
income and wealth can be excluded from the regression.  The reader  is 
reminded  that  this test is not based on the surprise  regressions  reported 
in the tables, but  rather  on a constrained  version  that  omits c,_  from  the 
right-hand  side (see footnote 17  above). 
SIMPLEST  SPECIFICATION:  THE  CONSUMPTION-INCOME 
RELATIONSHIP 
We warm  up by estimating  the simplest  possible consumption  func- 
tion: equations  2 and 1 with no z or q variables. Results are shown as 
regressions  2.1 and 2.2 in table 2. In this simple specification,  which we 
estimate  only  because  consumption-income  relationships  like  this  appear 
so often in the literature,  the surprise  and no-surprise  versions are very 
similar,  and we cannot come close to rejecting  the hypothesis that the 
two income coefficients in regression 2.1 are equal. By contrast, the 
hypothesis  that only surprises  matter  is rejected  at about the 3 percent 
level. The implied steady-state elasticity of C to  Y is 0.88, which is 
different  from 1.0 at the 10  percent  (but  not the 5 percent)  level. Neither 
longer lags of c nor longer lags of y were significant  when added to 
regression  2.1 or 2.2. 
This specification  is deficient  in many  respects. As a partial  remedy, 
we make three changes in moving  to regressions  2.3 and 2.4 in table 2. 
First,  we add  wealth  to the specification  by including  three  new variables: 
the logarithm  of real wealth, w,  divided into anticipated  and unantici- 
pated  components  in regression  2.3, and  the lagged  value  of this  variable. 
Our  measure  of wealth is the household  net worth variable  used in the 
MPS model, except that we adjust the value of the government  debt 
from  par  to market.24 
values of c and y in equation 1 can then be rationalized  by assuming  that transitory 
consumption  is a first-order  autoregressive  process. Hall is correct  that  it is very difficult 
to discriminate  between  partial  adjustment,  which  we tacitly  assume,  and  serial  correlation 
in the disturbance.  However, the data  strongly  reject  the idea that  income  is a first-order 
autoregressive  process. And  neither  theory  nor  the empirical  results  suggest  that  the error 
in the consumption  function  is serially  correlated.  So we prefer  our interpretation  over 
Hall's. 
24. The data necessary to do this come from W. Michael Cox, "The Behavior  of 
Treasury  Securities:  Monthly, 1942-1984"  (Federal  Reserve Bank of Dallas, February 
1985),  and  were kindly  provided  by him. 'roooo  0  't  't  - 
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Second,  in  recognition  of the  fact  that  C  is not  total  consumer  spending, 
we add a time trend  to the specification.  In doing this, we recognize  the 
danger  of picking  up a spurious  time trend.25  Nonetheless, a time trend 
seems called  for  on economic  grounds;  it could  represent  slowly  evolving 
changes in tastes between durables  and nondurables,  technological  or 
other  changes  in the available  menu  of goods, or other  things. 
Third,  the basic PIH-LCH  theory  suggests  that  consumption  depends 
on current  wealth and on current  and expected future labor income. 
Income from capital is omitted because the current market value of 
wealth is the best estimate  of the discounted  stream  of income that will 
be derived  from  the assets currently  owned. The problem,  of course, is 
that  disposable  labor  income is difficult  to measure  because the income 
tax is based on total income, not on labor  and  capital  income  separately. 
We constructed  a real  per capita  disposable  labor  income series, YL, as 
follows. Starting  with the NIPA breakdown  of personal  income into its 
components,  we apportioned  proprietors'  income into labor  and capital 
components  in the ratio  LII, where: 
L is the sum of wages and salaries  plus other  labor  income, and 
I is the sum of interest,  dividends,  and  rental  income. 
Then we attributed  personal income taxes to labor and capital in the 
same ratio, treated  all contributions  for social insurance  as deductions 
from  labor  income, and  attributed  all transfer  payments  to labor  income. 
Once these three  changes  are made, the fits of the equations  improve 
tremendously;  R2 rises by about 0.13, and the standard  error  falls by 
about  8 percent.  There  is no indication  of parameter  instability.  Believers 
in life-cycle theory  will find  comfort  in the fact that, when regression  2.4 
is run  using  total  income  rather  thanjust  labor  income, thereby  including 
both  wealth  and  the income  from  wealth  in  the formulation,  a non-nested 
hypothesis test unambiguously  selects labor income over total income 
as the appropriate  income variable.26 
25. The  reasons  are  discussed  in N. Gregory  Mankiw  and  Matthew  Shapiro,  "Trends, 
Random  Walks,  and  Tests of the Permanent  Income  Hypothesis"  (Yale  University,  1984), 
and Angus S. Deaton, "Life-Cycle  Models  of Consumption:  Is the Evidence  Consistent 
with the Theory?"  (Princeton  University,  1985). 
26. The test is the Cox test described  in M.H. Pesaran,  "On the General  Problem  of 
Model Selection,"  Review of Economic  Studies, vol. 41 (April 1974), pp. 153-71. The test 
rejects the hypothesis  that total income is the correct variable,  but cannot reject labor 
income. Using  labor  income, not total  income, as the appropriate  income  variable  makes 
irrelevant  the common argument  that the part of interest income (and expense) that Alan S. Blinder and Angus Deaton  483 
The wealth coefficients in regression 2.3 show that the significant 
wealth effect in regression 2.4 derives from unanticipated  changes in 
wealth, as  suggested by life-cycle theory. This finding will persist 
throughout  the study. Because each specification  has a sizable upward 
time trend, the estimated  long-run  elasticity of consumption  to income 
falls to below 0.6, and a unitary  elasticity can be rejected  decisively.27 
Since  the impact  elasticities  are  about  0.23, the dynamics  work  out  faster 
than  they did in the previous  regressions. 
When  income  is redefined,  the income  coefficients  change  moderately 
(compare regression 2.1 with regression 2.3,  or 2.2 with 2.4),  the 
coefficients  of expected and  unexpected  income  in regression  2.3 remain 
very  close to one another,  and  expected  income  remains  quite  significant. 
On the basis of a comparison  of regressions  2.4 and  2.3, the data  cannot 
reject the "no decomposition"  hypothesis that only actual values of y 
and  w matter  (marginal  significance  level =  46  percent).  But  the opposite 
extreme  hypothesis  that only surprises  matter  is still rejected  (marginal 
significance  level =  3.8 percent). 
RELATIVE  PRICE  TERMS 
Intertemporal  Prices. All the equations  in table  2 omit several  poten- 
tially  important  variables,  such as inflation  and  interest  rates. In theory, 
the after-tax  real interest rate should influence intertemporal  choice; 
that, after all, is the basic insight of Euler equations. But what is the 
effective tax rate  on interest  income, and  how should  expected inflation 
be measured? 
We measure one minus the effective marginal  tax rate on interest 
(1  -  T) as the ratio  of the yield on (tax-exempt)  five-year  AAA municipal 
represents  compensation  for inflation  should be deducted from standard  measures of 
income  in  arriving  at  a true  concept  of Hicksian  income.  However,  the  behavior  of liquidity 
constrained  consumers  is governed  by cash flow, not by Hicksian  income.  And,  for them, 
the  need  to make  interest  payments,  even if the  payments  merely  compensate  for  inflation, 
might  deter  consumption.  We  tested  for  this  by  adding  interest  payments  to our  regressions, 
but  found  erratic  and  insignificant  effects. 
27. Throughout  the paper, we calculate the long-run  income elasticity keeping the 
wealth-income  ratio  constant, so that both direct  income and indirect  wealth  effects are 
included.  If the time  trend  is omitted,  the estimated  long-run  elasticity  is very close to 1.0. 
It is hardly  surprising  that  the presence  or absence  of a time  trend  has  a dramatic  effect on 
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bonds to the yield on (taxable)  five-year  AAA corporate  bonds. In the 
sample,  T varies between 0.18 and 0.39. We then construct  an after-tax 
nominal  rate of interest by multiplying  the three-month  Treasury  bill 
rate  by (1 -  T).28 The regressions  use the interest  rate  known  at time t -  1 
for carrying  wealth  forward  to time t because this is the natural  timing  to 
use if we think of our specification  as representing  the intertemporal 
choice between consumption  in periods  t -  1 and  t.29 
Inflationary  expectations  are generated  from  our VAR, based on the 
deflator  for total  consumer  spending,  called  P. Both anticipated  inflation 
(EAp) and unanticipated inflation (Ap - EAp) are entered into regressions 
3.1 and 3.2 in table 3, the former  as a natural  companion  to the nominal 
interest  rate, the latter  to represent  the price confusion  effect proposed 
by Deaton. As noted earlier, however, we tested rather  than imposed 
the constraint that the coefficients of the nominal interest rate and 
expected inflation  be equal and opposite-as  would be true if only the 
real  interest  rate  mattered. 
The regression  results  suggest  that  nominal  interest  rates  are  of little, 
if any, importance  for consumption.  Comparing  regressions  3.1 and 3.2 
shows that the coefficient  of rt- I is much larger  in absolute value in the 
surprise  version, that is, when contemporaneous  variables  are instru- 
mented.  This was true  in every specification.30 
Inflation,  on the other  hand,  is quite  significant  in both specifications, 
though  only in unanticipated  form  in regression  3.1. Note, however, that 
expected inflation  gets the wrong sign in regression 3.1. If only real 
interest  rates matter,  EAp  and r should  have equal and opposite coeffi- 
cients. Though  this hypothesis  cannot  be rejected  at the 10  percent  level 
owing to large standard  errors, the sum of the coefficients is far from 
zero. Why  it should  be nominal  interest  rates, not real  rates, that  matter 
is a puzzle that has cropped up in other contexts.3' We have no good 
28. As an alternative,  we also tried  using the five-year  municipal  bond rate. Results 
were similar.  Since the short  rate makes  better  theoretical  sense, and  usually  provided  a 
slightly  better  fit, we report  only those results. 
29. In response  to suggestions  from  some readers,  we also tried  adding  current  r to the 
regression.  See footnote  30. 
30. When  r,was  added  to the  regressions,  the  results  did  not  change  much.  Specificially, 
r, and r,_  generally got large coefficients with opposite signs, reflecting  collinearity 
between  the two variables.  The sum  of the two coefficients  was small  and  negative. 
31. See, for example, Christopher  Sims, "Comparison  of Interwar  and Postwar 
Business  Cycles:  Monetarism  Reconsidered,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol. 70 (May 
1980, Papers and Proceedings,  1979), pp. 250-57; Robert Litterman and Laurence Weiss, Alan S. Blinder and Anguis  Deaton  485 
explanation  to offer. But, in any case, the best guess at this stage is that 
the significant  coefficient  of inflation  in regression  3.2 reflects  the price 
confusion  effect. 
There  are no notable  changes in coefficients  when interest  rates and 
inflation  are added  to the regressions,  although  the hypothesis  that  only 
surprises  matter  can no longer  be rejected. 
Relative Prices  of Different Goods.  In principle, consumers  should 
respond  not only to the relative  price of the same good in different  time 
periods,  but  also to the relative  prices  of different  goods in the same  time 
period.  This is easy to test. 
From among  the prices of the three main components  of consumer 
spending-PS,  the price of services; PND,  the price of nondurable 
goods; and  PD, the price of durables-we  selected the latter  two for the 
construction  of relative  price variables.  Regression  3.4, the no-surprise 
specification,  adds the two relative prices in both current  and lagged 
form; in logs,  the  new  variables  are (pn  -  p)t and (pn  -  p)t,I  for 
nondurables and (pd -  p)t and (pd -  p),-  for durables. However,  when 
we tried to enter anticipated,  unanticipated,  and lagged  relative prices 
in the surprise  specification,  regression  3.3, the anticipated  and lagged 
variables  were almost  perfectly  correlated.  Consequently,  3.3 omits the 
lagged  relative  prices. 
In addition,  our regressions  ought to include any other variable  that 
has a strong  influence  on the allocation  of income  between  durable  goods 
and  C. The stock of durables  at the start  of the quarter,  Kt,  is an obvious 
candidate,  since, given the desired stock, a higher  opening  stock ought 
to lead to lower spending  on durables,  and hence to higher  spending  on 
C, other  things  being  equal. 
Regressions  3.3 and 3.4 show a substantial  improvement  in fit over 
their  predecessors-R2 rises by about  0.08, and  the standard  error  of the 
equation  falls  by about  5 percent.  Five of the eight  relative  price  variables 
in the two regressions are significant.  In particular,  the large negative 
coefficients of (pn -  p)t in regression 3.4 and of the surprise in (pn -  p)t 
in regression  3.3 both suggest a strong transient  effect of the r  fl'-ave 
price of nondurable  goods. In either specification,  a 1 percent rise in 
"Money, Real Interest  Rates, and Output:  A Reinterpretation  of Postwar  U.S. Data" 
(Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,  January  1984);  and Alan S. Blinder, "Retail 
Inventory  Behavior  and  Business  Fluctuations,"  BPEA,  2:1981,  pp. 443-505. -s-  s 
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PND  relative to P (only if unanticipated  in regression  3.3) reduces the 
annual  growth rate of C by about 0.9 percent in the first quarter.  The 
estimated steady-state (or anticipated)  effects of pn  -  p are positive, 
however.32 
Results  are  weaker  for the relative  price  of durables,  pd -  p, although 
the steady-state  effect appears  to have the correct  (positive)  sign in both 
specifications. While the coefficient of the opening stock of durables 
gets insignificant  coefficients in both specifications,  we leave it in the 
regression  for theoretical  reasons lest it interact  in important  ways with 
any other  variable. 
Perhaps  more  interesting  than  the estimated  relative  price effects per 
se is the way the addition  of relative prices changes some of the other 
coefficients.  Two changes  are  particularly  notable.  First, regression  3.3, 
unlike  regression  3.1, strongly  suggests  that  only unanticipated  changes 
in income cause consumption to change. Second, the conclusion in 
regression  3.1 that  unanticipated  inflation  matters  more  than  anticipated 
inflation  is dramatically  reversed  in regression  3.3. In 3.3, and  in the rest 
of the regressions estimated for this study, the effect of inflation  on 
consumption seems to derive from anticipated  inflation.  The interest 
elasticity is a bit stronger, though still not significant,  when relative 
prices are included.  And the constraint  that  the coefficients  of r and  ElVp 
are equal and opposite can now be rejected strongly  in regression 3.3 
(marginal significance level  =  0.5 percent). 
Not surprisingly,  given these changes in coefficients, we can now 
reject, at the 0.8 percent level, the hypothesis that the split between 
anticipated  and unanticipated  components  does not matter.  This result 
nominates  regression  3.3 as our best consumption  function. In conse- 
quence, we display  in the appendix  the series on unanticipated  income, 
wealth,  and  inflation  that  underlie  regression  3.3. Nevertheless, we retain 
both 3.3 and 3.4 as baseline specifications  to be used in the next section 
because regression 3.3, but not 3.4, shows some slight evidence of 
parameter  instability  across half  samples,  and  because some economists 
are,  justifiably,  skeptical  of our method  for decomposing  variables  into 
32. The  theoretically  expected  sign  for  the  relative  price  of nondurable  goods  is unclear 
because the consumption  measure  includes services as well. Note too that the greater 
importance  of the "surprise"  as compared  with the anticipated  relative  prices could be 
interpreted  as evidence  of simultaneity  between  consumption  and  prices.  See our  discus- 
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anticipated  and unanticipated  components. Note also that our surprise 
equation  is not the pure surprise  version  of the PIH, because it includes 
both lagged  and  anticipated  terms. 
Further Investigation  of  Interest  Sensitivity.  The  implied  steady- 
state semi-elasticity  of consumption  to the nominal  rate of interest in 
regression  3.3 is - 2.3. That means that, with the path of income held 
constant,  a 1 percentage  point  rise in r will eventually  decrease C by 2.3 
percent-a  strong  effect. The result, however, seems to be fragile.  The 
strong  elasticity is to the nominal interest rate and does not appear  if 
only the real rate is allowed in the regression. Furthermore,  the strong 
negative  effect of the nominal  interest  rate appears  only in the surprise 
version;  the corresponding  semi-elasticity  in the no-surprise  regression 
is only -0.8.  Since there has been so much concern lately with the 
sensitivity of saving to the rate of return, we decided to look at the 
interest  elasticity  issue more  deeply. 
Regressions  4.1 through  4.4 in table  4 disaggregate  C into its two main 
components, nondurable  goods and services, and show, much to our 
astonishment,  that  it is actually  spending  on services, not on goods, that 
is sensitive to interest rates. We have a hard time believing that this 
sensitivity represents intertemporal  substitution, but cannot offer a 
better explanation.  The "equal and opposite" constraint  on the coeffi- 
cients of nominal  interest  rates and inflation  continues  to be rejected  at 
very exacting significance  levels for services, but not for nondurable 
goods. 
Dividing services into five component parts (housing, household 
operation,  transportation  services, other services, and state and local 
nontax receipts) shows that the significant  negative interest elasticity 
can  be traced  mainly  to housing  and  transportation  services. It may  seem 
surprising  at first that spending on these services should be interest 
elastic, but  each of these service flows relates  directly  to a durable  stock 
(houses and automobiles), the demand for which is probably quite 
sensitive  to interest  rates.33  That  observation  does not, of course, explain 
why it is the nominal  interest  rate  that  matters. 
33. Several  readers  suggested  that the negative  interest  elasticity  of housing  services 
is an artifact  of the BEA's imputation  procedures.  That  does not appear  to be the case, 
however.  Services  of owner-occupied  houses are imputed,  of course. But the imputation 
is based  on actual  observed  rent-to-value  ratios  on rented  houses,  deflated  by the  consumer 
price  index for rent. There  is no mechanical  linkage  between interest  rates and imputed 
housing services. I  I  It 
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As we had expected, the negative interest elasticities that we find 
cannot  be detected over a shorter  data  period  that  excludes the volatile 
1980s,  even though  the equations  pass formal  stability  tests. When we 
ran  the regressions  in tables 3 and  4 over a sample  ending  in 1979:4,  the 
estimated interest elasticities were either insignificantly  negative or 
positive. 
THE  BASELINE  CONSUMPTION  FUNCTION 
Hereafter, we shall take equations 3.3 and 3.4 to be our baseline 
consumption  functions, so it is worth  dwelling  a moment  on the steady- 
state properties of the two.  The implied steady-state consumption 
functions  from  regressions  3.3 and  3.4, respectively, are: 
C = 7.85 yO.78 W0.42 K0005  (PND)  1.28 (PD)  0.79e0.0019t 2.3r-8.8Ap 
and 
C = 6.76 Y053 WO25 K0015 (PND).31  PD  0.22  0019t-0.8r-1.5p 
The two steady-state  specifications  differ  mainly  because of different 
coefficients  on  ct  I  in  regressions  3.3  and  3.4. This  illustrates  the  difficulty 
of inferring  long-run  properties  from  short  time series. 
Not surprisingly,  most of the biggest  residuals  occur when c changes 
the most;  but  no residual  in the entire  sample  is as large  as three  standard 
errors.  The biggest  comes in 1983:2,  when  our  regression  fails to capture 
the huge (and transitory)  acceleration  of consumer spending.  We also 
miss the upward  "blip" in spending  that occurred  in 1965:4.  A plot of 
the residuals (not shown) has no evident runs of positive or negative 
residuals. In particular,  there is no tendency for the regressions to 
overpredict  consumption  growth (that is, produce negative residuals) 
after the introduction  of several special incentives for saving in the 
August 1981 tax bill; in regression 3.4, the mean residual for the 13 
quarters  1981:4-1984:4  is actually + 0.07 percent. 
Government  Policy and Consumption:  Tests of Hypotheses 
This section tests a variety of more controversial  hypotheses about 
how consumers  react to changes  in government  policy, such as tempo- Alan S. Blinder and Angus Deaton  493 
rary  taxes and budget  deficits. In each case, the baseline consumption 
function  of the previous  section serves as a starting  point. 
REACTIONS  TO  TEMPORARY  INCOME  TAX  CHANGES 
Friedman's  permanent  income hypothesis suggested long ago that 
consumers  should  react  to temporary  income tax changes  less than  they 
do to permanent  ones, and Lucas made that point part of his famous 
critique  of econometric  policy evalution.  Furthermore,  several  empirical 
studies have detected such a difference. In the most comprehensive 
study of the issue, Blinder  estimated  that consumers  treat  a temporary 
tax change  as roughly  half  ordinary  income  change,  half  pure  windfall.34 
To study  this issue, we begin, as Blinder  did in his previous  paper,  by 
dividing income along lines that differ from the usual permanent- 
transitory  distinction. Specifically,  we define "special" income, S,  as 
the disposable  income, positive or negative,  derived  from  temporary  tax 
changes  and "regular"  income,  R,  as the rest; that  is, R, =  Y, -  S,. The 
motivation  for  this  dichotomy  is that  special  income  is observably  "more 
transitory"  than regular  income, which is, itself, a blend of permanent 
and  transitory  components.  Because of this difference,  the PIH suggests 
that  S should  have a smaller  effect on consumption  than  does R; that  is, 
the appropriate  income variable  should  be: 
R  +  RS  =  Y-  (1 -  )S  =  Y[1  -  (1 -  R)S 
where ,u  is an empirically  estimated  coefficient  between zero and one. 
Since the log of a sum is not the sum of the logs, we approximate  the 
natural  log of this income concept as follows: 
lnY + ln[1  -  (1 -  r)]  lnY-  (1 -  ) 
which is an excellent approximation,  since the income involved in 
temporary  tax changes is small, always less than 4 percent of other 
income. Thus, to estimate p.,  we simply  need to add a new variable,  the 
ratio SIY,  to our regressions. Since y = lnY enters in both current  and 
lagged  form,  S/Yenters in current  and  lagged  form  as well. This gives us 
34. See Blinder,  "Temporary  Income  Taxes." 494  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
two different  estimates of (,  -  1): an impact effect derived from the 
ratio  of the coefficient  of (S!Y),  to that  of y, and  a long-run  effect derived 
from the sums of the (Sl!j and y coefficients.35  The pure PIH suggests 
that ,u should be near zero, while ,u =  1 means that actual measured 
income is the relevant  income concept. 
Before looking  at the results, we need to explain  how we constructed 
the S, series. We distinguished  four different temporary  tax change 
episodes. 
The 1968-70  tax  surcharge.  A  one-year  temporary  tax  surcharge 
began  in 1968:3  and was subsequently  extended, at reduced  rates, for a 
second year. The 1968-70 episode was studied by Arthur  Okun and 
William Springer with conflicting results.36  For this study, revised 
estimates  of the revenues  from  the surtax  during  the eight  quarters  of its 
existence were taken  from  the May 1978  issue of the Survey  of Current 
Business. 
The  1975  rebate. A rebate  of 1974  taxes was paid mostly in May and 
June of 1975,  with traces trickling  into the third  and fourth  quarters  of 
1975.  This episode was studied  by Modigliani  and  Charles  Steindel.37 
The other 1975 cuts. The 1975 tax act also reduced bracket rates 
"temporarily"  for one year. Since these rate cuts were subsequently 
extended in the Revenue Adjustment  Act of 1975  and again  in the Tax 
Reform  Act of 1976,  and eventually  became a permanent  feature  of the 
tax  code, we had  to make  an  arbitrary  assumption  about  when  consumers 
ceased viewing  them  as temporary.  We assumed  that  consumers  shifted 
linearly from viewing the cuts as 100 percent temporary  in 1976:1  to 
viewing  them  as 100  percent  permanent  by 1977:  1.  All three  of the above- 
mentioned  episodes were studied  by Blinder;38  but  data  on both 1975  tax 
reductions  have been revised since then, and  were kindly  provided  to us 
by the BEA. 
The  Reagan tax cuts. As mentioned  in the introduction,  the Reagan 
tax cuts of 1981-84 have given us another "temporary  tax" episode, 
though  one of a different  character  that  may  have  been treated  differently 
35. In the surprise  version,  we sum  the coefficients  of lagged  and  anticipated  variables 
to obtain  the long-run  effect. This  procedure  is followed  throughout. 
36. Okun,  "The  Personal  Tax Surcharge";  Springer,  "Did the 1968  Surcharge  Really 
Work?" 
37. Modigliani  and  Steindel,  "Is a Tax Rebate  an Effective  Tool?" 
38. Blinder,  "Temporary  Income  Taxes." Alan S. Blinder and Angus Deaton  495 
by consumers.  From  a strict  PIH  viewpoint,  one should  treat  the phased- 
in tax cuts as a large permanent  tax reduction  in the middle  of 1981:3 
coupled  with a temporary  tax increase  that  diminished  gradually  to zero 
by 1984:  1. The series is offered  for inspection  in table 5 and explained 
with the aid of the following  notation: 
A, is income  from  the actual  Reagan  tax cuts in quarter  t (mostly  BEA 
data from the April 1985 Survey of Current Business); 
T,  is income from the theoretical  "permanent"  tax cut applicable  to 
quarter  t (constructed  by us); 
S, is income from the theoretical  temporary  tax hike applicable  to 
quarter t (A, -  T,). 
We dealt separately  with each of the three reductions  in withholding 
rates  and the nonwithheld  part  of the liabilities. 
October 1981 withholding reductions.  Though the Reagan tax cuts 
were enacted in August 1981, the first stage was not effective until 
October.  We therefore  set T,  for 1981:3  equal to half the BEA value for 
A, in 1981:4. Since A, = 0 in 1981:3, St =  -  Tt  that quarter. Thereafter, 
the October  1981  cut was fully effective, so St  from  this source is zero. 
July 1982 withholding reductions.  BEA data assume that the July 1, 
1982,  rate  reductions  became effective on that date. But tax rates apply 
to calendar  years, so half the July 1 cuts actually applied  to the entire 
calendar  year. So we began  by changing  the BEA series on At by using 
quarterly  withholding  payments  to allocate  the calendar  1982  tax reduc- 
tion ($13.3  billion  at annual  rates) to the four quarters  of 1982.  We then 
estimated  T,  for each quarter  of 1982  by assuming  that  the full  July 1  rate 
reductions  were effective throughout  the year. Having done that, we 
constructed  St  as At -  Tt.  For quarters  beyond 1982:4,  the full  July 1982 
rate  reductions  were in effect, so St  from  this source  is zero. 
July 1983 withholding reductions.  The procedure used here is exactly 
the same  as that  for the July 1982  reductions. 
Nonwithheld  taxes. The BEA provided  data on At. We constructed 
Tt  by applying  the 1984  ratio  of nonwithheld  tax cuts to withheld  tax cuts 
to the quarters  from 1981:4  through  1983:4  (half  the rate  in 1981:3).  Then 
St was At -  Tt  as usual. 
There is every reason, however, to treat the St series for Reagan's 
"temporary  tax hike" differently  from  the others  because  the other  three 
episodes  were genuine  changes  in income  flows  received  by households, 
while the mythical  Reagan "hike" is a theoretical  construct based on 496  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
Table 5.  Estimated Consumer Income from Reagan Tax Reductions, 1981:3-1983:4a 
Billions of dollars 
Quarter  Actual  Permanent  Temporary 
1981:3  0.6  46.0  -45.4 
1981:4  18.6  88.0  -  69.4 
1982:1  39.7  91.1  -  51.4 
1982:2  40.4  93.4  -  53.0 
1982:3  40.9  95.4  -  54.5 
1982:4  41.3  96.8  -  55.5 
1983:1  81.7  97.0  -  15.3 
1983:2  83.5  99.4  -  15.9 
1983:3  85.1  101.7  -  16.6 
1983:4  87.6  105.0  -  17.4 
Source:  Authors' computations. 
a.  Starting in 1984:1, "actual"  and "permanent"  are equal,  so  "temporary"  is zero. 
the PIH. The following procedure  suggests itself. Suppose the income 
concept relevant  to consumption  in 1981:3-1983:4  was: 
Yt +  a(YtP  -  Y,)  =  Yt +  a( -S,*), 
where  YtP  -  Y  (-S*)  is the income  from promised  future tax cuts 
that  is currently  withheld;  this series is given, with sign reversed, in the 
last  column  of table  5. Thus  we see that  a is analogous,  but  not necessarily 
equal,  to the 1  - ,u  parameter  for the other  three  temporary  tax episodes; 
that  is, a =  1 connotes the pure  PIH, while a = 0 means  that  consumers 
ignored  the promised  future  tax cuts. 
Rather  than repeat long tables of regression  coefficients that hardly 
change, we report in table 6 and in the tables that follow only the 
estimates of the new coefficients and parameters  of interest, plus the 
relevant  test statistics.  We  will  note  any  important  changes  in  coefficients 
as we proceed. When temporary  tax change variables  were added, the 
most notable changes were an increase of about 50 percent in the 
coefficient  of lagged  consumption  and a doubling  of the estimated  time 
trend.  In consequence, the estimated  long-run  elasticity  of consumption 
to income  fell. 
In table 6, the variable SlY pertains to the 1968-70 and 1975-76 
temporary  tax changes, while S*!Y pertains  to the 1981-83  temporary 
tax change. For both episodes, the point estimates suggest that the 
effects of temporary  tax changes are near zero, that is, that they are 
ignored  by consumers. The long-run  effects are also near zero for the Alan S. Blinder and Angus Deaton  497 
Table  6. Tests  for Temporary  Taxes, 1954:1-1984:4a 
Regression 
Variable,  parameter,  and test  Surprise  No-surprise 
Ratio of income from temporary  tax 
to total labor  incomeb 
1968-70 and 1975-76 episode 
(SlY1,  -0.152(-  1.2)  -0.200(-  2.0) 
(S/  Y1,  l  - 0.077(  -0.7)  - 0.120(  -  1.2) 
1981-83 episode 
WM*lY),  - 0.014(-0.1)  -0.014(-0.1) 
WM*lY),-,l  - 0.010(- 0.1)  0.041  (0.3) 
Parameterc 
Long-run  income elasticity  0.83  0.62 
Estimated  p. 
Impact  0.12  - 0.06 
Impact  and lagged  -  1.37  -  1.51 
Estimated  a 
Impact  0.08  0.07 
Impact  and lagged  0.24  -0.22 
Test of hypotheses 
(marginal significance  levels)d 
Strict  PIH (p.  = 0, a = 1)  0.49  0.059 
Measured  income (p.  = 1, a = 0)  0.50  0.058 
Unit elasticity  0.64  0.017 
Real interest  rate  0.011  0.041 
No decomposition  0.074  ... 
No decomposition  for income and wealth  0.24  ... 
Surprises  only  0.98  ... 
Sources:  Same as table 2. 
a.  The dependent  variable is the change  in log of consumption  of nondurable goods  and services.  New  variables 
are added to baseline  equations 3.3 and 3.4. 
b.  These  are coefficients  of the indicated variables in the regressions. 
c.  As described  in the text,  the parameters are estimated  as the ratio of coefficients  from the regression. 
d.  This is the probability, expressed  in a decimal,  of getting the indicated coefficients  if the hypothesis  is correct. 
Reagan  episode, but are actually strongly  negative for the pre-Reagan 
episodes-which means  that  consumption  moved  in the wrong  direction. 
These estimates are quite different  from Blinder's 0.50 estimate of a 
parameter  similar  to ,u  published  four  years  ago, based  on unrevised  data 
and a very different  specification.  The source of this discrepancy  is an 
intriguing  question  for future  research. 
The null  hypothesis  a = 1  and ,u = 0 corresponds  roughly  to the strict 
PIH in that it says that the relevant  income concept excluded the 1968 
and 1975-76  temporary  tax changes  but  treated  the Reagan  tax cuts as if 498  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
they were fully  effective in August 1981.  This  hypothesis  can be rejected 
in the no-surprise  version of the model, though only at the 6 percent 
level; it cannot  be rejected  at any  reasonable  level in the surprise  version, 
owing to larger  standard  errors.  The opposite extreme  hypothesis, that 
a = 0 and ,u  =  1, says that  consumers  spend  on the basis of conventional 
measured  income, with  no special  allowance  for temporary  tax changes. 
This hypothesis again  can be rejected  in the no-surprise  version only at 
the 6 percent  level, and  not at all in the surprise  version. 
While these results are probably not precise enough to persuade 
anyone to abandon  strongly  held a priori  views, they do point toward  a 
mixed conclusion (a = 0 and ,u = 0) in which consumers  do not spend 
on the basis of income  received from  temporary  tax cuts (in accord  with 
the PIH) but nonetheless ignored  the promised  tax reductions  of 1981- 
84 until  they actually  occurred  (an anti-PIH  result). 
Because the 1975  rebate  was received so late in the second quarter  of 
1975, we tried estimating separate coefficients for the rebate on the 
supposition  that (SIY),1 might  be relatively  more important  than (S!Y), 
for the rebate  than for other temporary  tax episodes. This did not turn 
out to be true,  however. We also tried  to distinguish  between  anticipated 
and  unanticipated  temporary  tax changes. But the estimates  were based 
on so little data  that  the standard  errors  were enormous. 
IS  THE  GOVERNMENT  VEIL  PIERCED? 
Our  preliminary  look at the data in the introductory  section made it 
appear  as though  households (or households  and businesses combined) 
did not raise their  saving  to offset the rise in government  dissaving  after 
1981,  as would be expected if debt and taxes were equivalent.  Here we 
investigate  the Barro  equivalence  hypothesis  more  rigorously. 
If the Barro  hypothesis  is right,  our consumption  function  is misspe- 
cified  in two ways. First, the market  value  of the government  debt  should 
be omitted from household net worth. This is easily done, thanks to 
extremely accurate  estimates of the market  value of the debt compiled 
and kindly provided to us by Michael Cox.39 To test the Barro hypothesis 
against  the traditional  specification,  it is natural  to replace lnW in our 
regressions  by  ln(W  -  D  +  RI1D),  where  D  is  the  market value  of 
39. Cox, "The Behavior  of Treasury  Securities." Alan S. Blinder and Angus Deaton  499 
government  debt. If RI'  = 0, the Barro  hypothesis is correct;  if RI =  1, 
the full government  debt is included  in wealth (that is, there is no tax 
discounting).  Using the same approximation  as before, this amounts  to 
replacing lnW by two variables: ln(W -  D) and D!(W -  D). The ratio of 
the two coefficients  is an estimate  of RI. 
Second, if Barro  is right,  disposable  labor  income  is the wrong  income 
concept. But what  income concept is right?  We answer  this question  in 
stages, first supposing  that we were working  with total income rather 
than  just labor  income. 
Consumers  who pierce the government  veil presumably  understand 
that  the income  actually  available  to them  is net national  product  (NNP)40 
minus government  purchases (G) minus transfers  and interest paid by 
the U.S. government  to foreigners  plus state and local personal  nontax 
payments.41  Call  this  concept  of income YB.  Manipulation  of some NIPA 
identities  reveals that: 
(4)  YB =  Y + RET +  SURP, 
where Yis  total  disposable  income  as defined  by us, S URP  is the ordinary 
NIPA government  surplus,  and  the inclusion  of RET,  retained  earnings, 
reflects  the hypothesis  that  the corporate  veil is also pierced. 
Now we must come to grips  with the fact that our baseline specifica- 
tion, regressions  3.3 and 3.4, uses labor  income, not total income, and 
that  identity  4 does not hold in labor  income. We begin  by defining 
DIFF=  YB-  Y 
as the difference between the Barro concept of total income and our 
own. Since retentions are irrelevant  in a specification  based on labor 
income,  we  eliminate  them,  which  makes DIFF  =  SURP.42 Assume 
that  a portion  X,  = L!(L + 1)  of the surplus  gets into labor  income, where 
40. Seater  and Mariano,  in "New Tests," use GNP rather  than  NNP. We do not see 
the argument  for including  depreciation. 
41. Because  transfers  and  interest  paid  by the U.S. government  are sent abroad,  they 
are not available  to domestic  households.  State and local personal  nontax  payments  are 
considered  to be personal  consumption,  as explained  above. 
42. To check that  this decision  did not bias the case against  the Barro  hypothesis,  we 
ran  regressions  that  included  a retentions  variable  and  tested the restrictions  that  exclude 
this variable.  The restrictions  could not be rejected.  We also tested the Barro  hypothesis 
on the assumption  that  retentions  should  be included  as part  of labor  income. The results 
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X,  is the ratio  we used earlier  to define  labor  income. Then a reasonable 
concept of labor  income if the Barro  hypothesis  is correct  is: 
YBL  =  YL +  XSURP. 
Hence, using the usual approximation,  we can replace ln(YL)  in our 
regressions  by: 
ln(YL  +  OXSURP)  =  lnYL  +  OX 
SURP 
If Barro  is right,  0  = 1, which means  that  we should  redefine  income by 
adding back labor's share of taxes and subtracting  labor's share of 
government  purchases. 
But  that  procedure  would  saddle  Barro's  hypothesis  with  an auxiliary 
constraint that is  no part of the tax discounting idea, namely that 
government  purchases  have no direct effect on the marginal  utility of 
private  consumption.  If, instead,  government  nondefense  purchases,  G, 
are either substitutes  or complements  for private  consumption,  there  is 
no reason  to enter  G and  taxes, net of transfers,  with  equal  and  opposite 
signs, as would  be done if we used the variable  SURP. To allow  for this, 
we add to the regression  g  =  logG, both contemporaneously,  decom- 
posed into anticipated  and unanticipated  components in the surprise 
version, and  lagged.43 
The results  are reported  in table  7. The coefficients  on the current,  or 
surprise,  versions of the new income variable  X,  (SURP/YL), are very 
small, but those on the lagged,  or anticipated,  terms  are large  enough  to 
suggest  that  a substantial  fraction  (55  percent  in the no-surprise  version 
and 92 percent in the surprise version) of future taxes is eventually 
discounted back to the present. The coefficients of the new wealth 
variables  imply estimates of RI  of 1.0 or more. Hence, while the point 
estimates of the income coefficients give some support to the Barro 
hypothesis, the wealth  coefficients  are the opposite of what  it requires. 
This rather  odd combination  of coefficients  probably  reflects  the fact 
that  the big  movements  in both  of the special  Barro  variables  (for  income 
and for wealth) came at the same time. Unfortunately,  because some 
43. The coefficients  of government  spending  were generally  positive and  of marginal 
significance  in the regressions,  indicating  that government  purchases  and private  con- 
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Table  7. Tests  of Barro  Hypothesis,  1954:1-1984:4a 
Regression 
Variable,  parameter,  and test  Surprise  No-surprise 
Barro  income  variableb,c 
Lagged  - 0.009(  - 0.1)  0.039(1.0) 
Anticipated  0.094  (0.7)  0.002(0.05) 
Unanticipated  0.008  (0.2)1  .0(.5 
Ratio  of government  debt to other wealthc 
Lagged  -0.203(-0.6)  0.012(0.1) 
Anticipated  0.257  (0.6)1  0176(1 3) 
Unanticipated  0.157  (0.9)0 
Parameterd 
Long-run  income elasticity  1.77  1.23 
Estimated  0 
Impact  0.05  0.01 
Impact  and lagged  0.92  0.55 
Estimated  [t, 
Impact  1.18  2.75 
Impact  and lagged  3.54  3.30 
Test of hypotheses 
(marginal significance  levels)e 
Barro  hypothesis  (0= 1, p,=0)  0.51  0.016 
Traditional  hypothesis  (0=0,  t=,  1)  0.72  0.060 
Unit elasticity  0.66  0.63 
Real interest  rate  0.48  0.53 
No decomposition  0.061  ... 
No decomposition  for income and wealth  0.15  ... 
Surprises  only  0.54 
Half-sample  stability  0.033  0.0027 
Reagan  stability  0.68  0.26 
Sources:  Same as table 2. 
a.  The dependent variable is the change in log of consumption of nondurable goods and services.  For each variable, 
xt,  the  anticipated  variable  is  defined  as  Ext,  the  unanticipated  variable  as  xt-Ext.  New  variables  are  added  to 
baseline equations  3.3 and 3.4. 
b.  The variable is defined as X(SURP/YL), where  X is the labor share,  SURP  is the government  surplus, and  YL 
is labor income. 
c.  These  are coefficients  of the indicated variables in the regressions. 
d.  As described  in the text,  the parameters are estimated  as the ratio of coefficients  from the regression. 
e.  This is the probability, expressed  as a decimal,  of getting the indicated coefficients  if the hypothesis  is correct. 
coefficients  support  Barro  neutrality  and others contradict  it, the equa- 
tion's implications  for the neutrality  hypothesis  are not transparent.  To 
understand  better what the coefficients mean, we ran a simulation  in 
which  personal  income  taxes fell by $25  per capita  ($100  at annual  rates) 
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thereafter,44  with all other variables  in the regression  held constant.45  If 
the neutrality  hypothesis were correct, such an event would have no 
effect on consumption.  The actual simulated  effects on the level of real 
per capita consumption  of nondurable  goods and services are given in 
table 8, where they are juxtaposed against the results implied by the 
traditional  model (0 =  0, RI =  1). The results are far closer to the 
implications  of the traditional  view than they are to the zeros called for 
by the Barro  hypothesis. 
In the no-surprise specification, a formal test rejects the Barro 
hypothesis  at the 1.6 percent  level, though,  with a marginal  significance 
level of 6 percent,  the traditional  view does little  better.  The much  larger 
standard  errors  of the surprise  specification  preclude  rejection  of either 
extreme hypothesis. These equations  are the first ones in this paper  to 
show severe parameter  instability.  Surprisingly,  given the specification 
and the recent behavior  of the government  budget  deficit, it is the test 
for stability  over half  periods, not the test comparing  the Reagan  period 
with the rest of the sample, that fails miserably. Tests of the Barro 
hypothesis  over a sample  period  ending  in 1981:2  yield results  similar  to 
those in table  7. Finally,  we note that  the addition  of the Barro  variables 
changes a number  of the other coefficients. But, to conserve space, we 
do not detail  all these changes. 
TAX  DISCOUNTING  WITHIN  A  YEAR? 
The standard  PIH-LCH without bequests can be thought  of as the 
hypothesis that households smooth consumption  over their lifetimes. 
Similarly,  the Barro  hypothesis  can be thought  of as the hypothesis  that 
dynasties  smooth  consumption  over  periods  much  longer  than  a lifetime. 
Our  baseline  specification,  regressions  3.3 and 3.4, supports  one impor- 
tant  implication  of the standard  PIH:  that  only unanticipated  movements 
in income  and  wealth  lead to changes  in consumption.  But our  results  in 
44. The  government  debt  variable  in the model  is real  debt  per  capita,  which  naturally 
falls as population  and  prices  rise. 
45. Among  the other  variables  held  constant  is wealth  exclusive of government  debt, 
which falls if spending  rises. We cannot allow for this reaction, however, because our 
measure  of  consumption  excludes  durables.  Hence,  the  numbers  in  table  8 slightly  overstate 
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Table 8.  Effects on Consumption of a Debt-Financed Temporary Tax Cut,  1981:4- 
1984:4a 
Dollars 
Surprise  equation 
No-surprise  equation  Surprise  tax cut  Expected  tax cut 
Estimated  Traditional  Estimated  Traditional  Estimated Traditional 
Quarter  effects  hypothesis  effects  hypothesis  effects  hypothesis 
1981:4  11.39  11.52  9.88  10.37  2.65  8.79 
1982:1  -  0.11  2.04  6.52  6.24  1.24  4.35 
1982:4  1.67  1.27  2.72  4.74  1.11  2.29 
1983:4  2.34  0.92  0.53  3.82  1.00  1.10 
1984:4  2.46  0.81  -0.31  3.37  0.97  0.60 
Source:  Authors' computations  based on the equations  in table 7. 
a.  Real per capita consumption  of nondurable goods  and services. 
table 7 offer at least some evidence against the Barro equivalence 
hypothesis. 
A test of a much weaker smoothing hypothesis-that  consumers 
smooth their spending  over the annual  April 15 tax settlement date- 
provides  a useful cross check on our previous results. That consumers 
do at least this much smoothing  may seem self-evident, but newspaper 
reports  last winter claimed that consumer spending  was low in 1985:1 
because of Internal  Revenue Service delays in processing tax refunds. 
We can test the "smoothing  over April 15" hypothesis because, while 
official NIPA data use income tax payments rather than income tax 
liabilities in defining disposable income, the BEA also publishes a 
quarterly  time series on tax liabilities.46 
A weak requirement  of the PIH ought  to be that  consumers  base their 
spending  plans on income net of tax liabilities, not net of payments. 
When TP is defined as payments and TL as liabilities, the concept of 
labor  income  relevant  to consumers  is: 
YL +  X(TP  -  TL), 
rather  than  just YL. The assumption  is that  labor's  share  in tax liabilities 
46. The sample period  is one year shorter  for these tests because 1984  data on tax 
liabilities  are not yet available.  Data sources  are as follows: for 1953-75,  U.S. Bureau  of 
Economic  Analysis,  Survey of Current Business,  vol. 58 (May 1978);  for 1976-79,  Survey 
of Current Business,  vol. 63 (January  1983);  for 1980,  Survey of Current Business,  vol. 64 
(April  1984);  for 1981-83,  Survey of Current Business,  vol. 65 (May 1985). 504  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
is the same as labor's share in tax payments. To test whether it is 
liabilities  or payments that really matter, we replace lnYL  wherever it 
appears  by: 
ln[YL  +  2 A(TP  -  TL)]  lnYL +  i2X(TP -  TL) 
YL 
The test, however, is not likely to have much power because the 
variance  of X(TP -  TL) is small  compared  to that  of YL. 
Table 9 summarizes  the results. Of the four implied  estimates of P2, 
all but one, which is very poorly determined,  are fairly close to unity. 
Although  the formal  tests cannot  reject  either  extreme  hypothesis,  P2  = 
O  or  2  =  1, owing to large  standard  errors,  they prefer  the latter.  Given 
that low discriminatory  power was to be expected, there appears  to be 
no evidence against short-run  smoothing here; so we are inclined to 
accept the theoretical  prediction  that  liabilities,  not payments,  influence 
consumption. 
Conclusion:  What Have We Learned? 
The hypotheses we have tested suggest one main change in our 
baseline  consumption  functions:  that  the  income  derived  from  temporary 
tax changes should  be eliminated  from  disposable  labor  income. In our 
original  baselines  in table  3, we made  this adjustment  for  the 1975  rebate, 
but not for the other temporary  tax episodes. The regressions  reported 
in table 10  make  this change. 
For several reasons, we tend to think of the surprise  regression in 
table  10  as our  best  consumption  function.  First,  the "no decomposition" 
hypothesis  that  leads to the no-surprise  specification  is soundly  rejected. 
Second, the surprise  regression has smaller unexplained  time trends. 
Third, and related to this, the long-run  elasticity of consumption  with 
respect  to income, when wealth  effects are  included  by keeping  the ratio 
of wealth to income constant, does not differ  significantly  from  unity in 
the surprise  regression  but  does in the no-surprise  regression.  However, 
the corresponding  no-surprise  regression is also provided for readers 
who prefer a more traditional  specification that does not rely on an 
admittedly  questionable  procedure  for  dividing  variables  into  anticipated 
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Table 9.  Tests of Tax Discounting Within the Year,  1954:1-1983:4a 
Regression 
Variable,  parameter,  and test  Surprise  No-surprise 
Tax payments  minus liabilities  income 
variableb,c 
Lagged  0.043  (0.2)  -0.004(-0.03) 
Anticipated  -0.207(-0.6)1  0155  (1.4) 
Unanticipated  0.164  (1.4)0 
Parameterd 
Estimated  R2 
Impact  0.84  0.83 
Impact  and lagged  -2.29  1.37 
Test of hypotheses 
(marginal significance  levels)e 
R2  =  0  0.47  0.31 
R2  =  1  0.62  0.78 
Unit elasticity  0.44  0.14 
Real interest  rate  0.004  0.076 
No decomposition  0.018  ... 
No decomposition  for income and wealth  0.041  ... 
Surprises  only  0.94  ... 
Half-sample  stability  0.23  0.30 
Reagan  stability  0.57  0.52 
Sources:  Same as table 2. 
a.  Dependent  variable is the change  in log of consumption  of  nondurable goods  and services.  For each  variable, 
xt,  the  anticipated  variable is  defined as  Ext, the unanticipated  variable  as xt  -  Ext. New  variables  are added  to 
baseline equations  3.3 and 3.4. 
b.  The variable is defined as X[(TP-TL)/YL], where  X is labor share,  TP is tax payments,  TL is tax liabilities,  and 
YL is labor income. 
c.  These  are coefficients  of the indicated variables in the regressions. 
d.  As described  in the text,  the parameters are estimated  as the ratio of coefficients  from the regressions. 
e.  This is the probability, expressed  as a decimal,  of getting the indicated coefficients  if the hypothesis  is correct. 
The main  conclusions  of this study are the following. 
There do seem to be empirical  gains from decomposing  income and 
wealth changes into anticipated  and unanticipated  components, as the 
"rational  expectations"  approach  to the  consumption  function  suggests. 
It seems to be mainly  unexpected, not expected, changes  in income and 
wealth  that  cause consumption  to change,  just as modern  versions  of the 
permanent  income hypothesis suggest. In fact, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis  that  lagged  and  anticipated  income and  wealth  are irrelevant 
to changes  in consumption.  This may reflect  the fact that in our formu- 
lations of expectations, much of the time series variance  of changes in 
income  and  wealth  is unexpected. 
The rate of interest has an insignificantly  negative influence on Table 10. Augmented  Baseline  Regressionsa 
Regression 
Independent  variable,  summary statistic,  Surprise  No-surprise 
and test of hypothesis  10.1  10.2 
Constant  -0.19  (-  0.4)  0.38  (1.4) 
Time trend  (x 103)  0.26  (1.0)  0.49  (2.6) 
Lagged consumption  -  0.126( -  1.5)  -  0.221( -  3.6) 
Income 
Lagged  0.141  (0.8)  - 0.053(- 1.0) 
Anticipated  - 0.048(-0.3)  0.171  (3.4) 
Unanticipated  0.178  (3.3) 
Wealth 
Lagged  0.034  (0.7)  -0.020(-0.6) 
Anticipated  0.012  (0.2)  0.060  (2.0) 
Unanticipated  0.116  (3.0) 
After-tax  nominal  interest  rate, lagged  -0.274(-  1.3)  -0.141(-  1.0) 
Inflation 
Anticipated  - 0.928(  - 2.7)1  - 0.259(- 18) 
Unanticipated  -0.127( - 0.8)  - 
Relative  price of nondurable  goods 
Lagged  ...  0.281  (2.8) 
Anticipated  -0.135(-2.7)  -0.220(-2.1) 
Unanticipated  - 0.23.1(2).1)J 
Relative  price of durable  goods 
Lagged  ...  0.042  (0.5) 
Anticipated  0.078  (2.1)]  - 0.009(- 01) 
Unanticipated  0.022  (0.2)- 
Stock of durable  goods 
Anticipated  - 0.003(  - 0.1)]  -0001-0.1) 
Unanticipated  0.108  (0.6)  -.0(01 
Summary statistic 
R  2  0.541  0.515 
Standard  error  (x 100)  0.340  0.343 
Sum of square  residuals  (x 100)  0.122  0.129 
Degrees of freedom  106  110 
Long-run  income elasticity  1.08  0.71 
Test of hypotheses 
(marginal significance  levels)b 
Unit elasticity  0.86  0.081 
Real interest  rate  0.008  0.038 
No decomposition  0.015  ... 
No decomposition  for income and wealth  0.081 
Surprises  only  0.81  ... 
Half-sample  stability  0.063  0.14 
Reagan  stability  0.31  0.34 
Sources:  Same as table 2. 
a.  For each variable, x,,  the anticipated variable is defined as Ext, the unanticipated variable as xt  -  Ext. 
b.  This is the probability, expressed  as a decimal,  of getting the indicated coefficients  if the hypothesis  is correct. Alan S. Blinder and Angus Deaton  507 
consumption.  What  effect it has  is on services, rather  than  on nondurable 
goods. Surprisingly,  it is the nominal, not the real, interest rate that 
seems to matter. Inflation  has a substantial  independent  influence on 
consumption.  Other  things  being  equal,  higher  anticipated  inflation  leads 
to lower spending. 
Relative prices matter. In particular,  a rise in the relative price of 
nondurable  goods leads to slower growth in spending  on nondurable 
goods  and  services  in the short  run.  Relative  prices  also matter  in another 
important  sense: including  them in the consumption  function changes 
our assessment of the effects of several critical variables, such as 
inflation,  interest  rates, and  anticipated  income. 
Temporary  tax changes appear  to have had little, if any, effect on 
consumption,  as the PIH suggests. But consumers seem not to have 
treated  the Reagan  "temporary  tax hike" as a temporary  tax. 
There is some inconsistency in our equations regarding  the Barro 
neutrality  hypothesis. Though  it appears  that consumers discount the 
future tax liabilities  implied by government  debt, it also appears that 
government  bonds are viewed as net wealth. When the income and 
wealth  coefficients  are combined,  however, the equations  clearly  imply 
that  a debt-financed  tax cut raises consumption  substantially. 
Simple  specifications  that  relate  consumption  to income  and,  perhaps, 
to one or two other variables, often give misleading  results compared 
with the fuller  models discussed here. Several of the preceding  conclu- 
sions would not be apparent  in the simple consumption  functions that 
frequently  appear  in the literature. 
APPENDIX 
Time Series on Unanticipated Variables 
THE TIME SERIES  on unanticipated  income, wealth, and inflation  used in 
our original  baseline model (regression  3.3) are given in columns 2, 4, 
and  6 in table  A- 1. Each series is  juxtaposed  against  the actual  change  in 
the corresponding  time series, in columns 1, 3, and 5. Changes  are in 
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Table A-1.  Income, Wealth, and Inflation, 1954-84 
Percent 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Change  Unantici-  Change  Unantici-  Change  Unantici- 
in log  pated  in log  pated  in  pated 
income  income  wealth  wealth  inflation  inflation 
1954:1  -0.866  -0.345  0.650  -0.726  0.509  0.315 
1954:2  -0.810  -  0.866  1.356  -0.688  -0.287  0.199 
1954:3  0.799  0.603  2.156  0.127  -  0.907  -  0.776 
1954:4  1.460  0.452  1.853  -0.001  0.654  0.003 
1955:1  0.428  -0.507  0.924  -  1.009  0.696  0.520 
1955:2  1.941  1.400  1.572  -  0.003  -  0.484  -0.175 
1955:3  1.033  0.259  1.867  0.585  0.303  0.119 
1955:4  1.078  0.471  1.858  0.648  -  0.546  -  0.378 
1956:1  0.608  -0.143  -  0.238  -  0.855  0.384  -0.098 
1956:2  0.183  -  0.230  0.430  0.705  0.391  0.200 
1956:3  0.049  0.110  0.644  0.523  0.018  0.023 
1956:4  0.641  0.872  0.096  -0.043  0.066  0.013 
1957:1  -0.329  0.049  -  1.046  -0.719  0.085  0.134 
1957:2  0.029  0.593  0.793  1.500  -  0.323  -  0.195 
1957:3  -0.216  -0.122  -0.073  -0.302  0.305  0.341 
1957:4  -  0.862  -  0.682  -  0.833  -  0.805  -  0.553  -  0.316 
1958:1  -  1.547  -  1.267  -  1.097  -  0.570  0.692  0.521 
1958:2  0.360  0.375  1.750  1.241  -0.982  -0.412 
1958:3  1.702  0.911  1.322  -0.236  0.130  -  0.204 
1958:4  1.078  0.306  1.822  0.805  -  0.016  -0.249 
1959:1  -0.298  -0.369  1.923  1.114  0.486  0.153 
1959:2  1.006  1.024  1.720  0.341  -0.136  -0.100 
1959:3  -  1.198  -  1.422  0.621  -0.137  0.273  0.192 
1959:4  -  0.031  0.063  0.676  0.544  -0.476  -  0.291 
1960:1  -0.009  -  0.512  -0.904  -  0.756  0.005  -0.144 
1960:2  0.504  0.387  -  0.032  0.646  0.207  0.158 
1960:3  -0.610  -  1.136  -  0.350  -  0.899  -  0.217  -  0.177 
1960:4  -0.785  -  1.446  -0.326  -0.551  0.160  0.249 
1961:1  0.518  -0.347  1.379  0.906  -  0.524  -  0.228 
1961:2  1.131  -0.105  2.238  1.114  0.124  -0.042 
1961:3  0.741  -0.315  0.808  -0.811  0.350  0.207 
1961:4  1.252  0.838  1.657  1.054  -0.298  -  0.206 
1962:1  0.729  0.152  0.290  -0.500  0.349  0.118 
1962:2  0.510  0.171  -  1.526  -  1.702  -0.043  -0.017 
1962:3  -  0.246  -  0.594  -  2.116  -  1.518  -  0.140  -  0.097 
1962:4  0.009  -0.429  -0.121  0.418  0.163  0.302 
1963:1  0.306  -0.580  1.478  0.199  -0.071  0.277 
1963:2  0.596  -0.511  2.083  0.089  -0.196  0.165 Alan S. Blinder and Angus Deaton  509 
Table A-1.  Income, Wealth, and Inflation, 1954-84  (Continued) 
Percent 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Change  Unantici-  Change  Unantici-  Change  Unantici- 
in log  pated  in log  pated  in  pated 
income  income  wealth  wealth  inflation  inflation 
1963:3  0.503  -0.763  0.649  -  1.281  0.248  0.522 
1963:4  0.839  -0.449  0.554  -0.511  -0.042  0.396 
1964:1  1.652  0.593  1.195  0.330  -0.000  0.362 
1964:2  2.637  1.379  1.835  0.579  -  0.297  -0.024 
1964:3  1.016  -  0.393  1.163  -0.078  0.224  0.170 
1964:4  0.773  -0.141  1.491  0.676  -0.116  -  0.127 
1965:1  0.670  0.002  0.790  0.223  0.282  0.057 
1965:2  0.714  0.357  0.860  0.590  0.147  0.042 
1965:3  2.192  1.238  0.592  0.243  -0.185  -  0.116 
1965:4  1.506  0.523  1.142  1.183  -0.022  -0.266 
1966:1  0.610  -  0.324  0.003  -  0.324  0.472  0.024 
1966:2  0.544  -0.048  -  1.398  -  1.174  -0.157  -0.287 
1966:3  1.079  0.112  -  2.565  -  1.780  0.047  -  0.111 
1966:4  1.112  0.390  -  1.397  -0.198  -0.124  -0.213 
1967:1  1.058  0.197  1.856  2.006  -0.472  -  0.528 
1967:2  0.541  -  0.573  3.321  1.547  0.333  -  0.122 
1967:3  0.554  -0.347  1.392  -  1.022  0.304  0.025 
1967:4  0.667  -0.144  0.147  -  0.485  0.015  -0.044 
1968:1  1.271  0.859  -0.571  -0.294  0.393  0.263 
1968:2  1.593  1.167  2.018  2.200  -0.334  -0.222 
1968:3  0.265  -0.684  1.905  0.970  -  0.001  -  0.144 
1968:4  0.518  -0.181  1.539  0.731  0.205  -0.003 
1969:1  -0.123  -0.880  -0.385  -0.548  -0.136  -0.163 
1969:2  0.606  0.058  -  1.078  0.065  0.286  0.127 
1969:3  1.700  0.826  -  1.202  -  0.125  -0.119  0.044 
1969:4  0.209  -0.589  -  1.048  0.276  0.058  0.113 
1970:1  0.368  -0.018  -  0.893  -  0.216  -  0.092  -  0.007 
1970:2  1.846  1.192  -  1.825  -  1.758  -0.107  -0.109 
1970:3  0.489  -0.172  -  1.637  -  1.211  -0.114  -0.157 
1970:4  -0.757  -1.301  1.024  0.635  0.429  0.363 
1971:1  1.676  1.125  3.147  0.558  -  0.357  -  0.017 
1971:2  1.170  0.355  2.855  -0.521  0.108  -  0.003 
1971:3  -0.211  -0.856  -0.107  -2.213  -0.077  -0.067 
1971:4  0.520  0.472  -  0.073  -  0.080  -  0.284  - 0.383 
1972:1  0.699  -0.016  1.584  0.969  0.295  0.049 
1972:2  1.021  -0.140  2.815  0.960  -  0.283  -  0.258 
1972:3  0.650  -0.681  1.157  -0.673  0.172  -  0.154 
1972:4  2.937  1.814  1.882  1.269  -0.005  -  0.262 510  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
Table A-1.  Income, Wealth, and Inflation, 1954-84  (Continued) 
Percent 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Change  Unantici-  Change  Unantici-  Change  Unantici- 
in log  pated  in log  pated  in  pated 
income  income  wealth  wealth  inflation  inflation 
1973:1  1.564  0.161  1.494  0.701  0.508  0.023 
1973:2  0.521  -0.037  -0.257  -0.505  0.519  0.242 
1973:3  0.122  0.096  -0.501  0.431  -  0.205  -0.143 
1973:4  0.258  0.619  -  0.338  1.113  0.307  0.010 
1974:1  -  2.068  -  1.621  -  2.003  -  1.555  0.887  0.740 
1974:2  -  0.736  0.497  -  1.432  -0.440  -  0.354  0.056 
1974:3  -0.438  0.365  -  2.694  -  1.975  -0.118  0.109 
1974:4  -  1.210  -0.781  -2.618  -  1.874  0.044  0.536 
1975:1  -0.762  -0.661  1.134  0.827  -  1.116  -0.295 
1975:2  1.647  1.292  2.969  0.768  -0.183  -  0.222 
1975:3  1.748  0.420  0.875  -  2.070  0.665  0.616 
1975:4  0.709  0.133  0.399  -0.884  -  0.390  -  0.092 
1976:1  1.400  1.279  3.179  2.190  -0.544  -  0.633 
1976:2  0.222  -0.492  3.661  1.268  0.026  -0.411 
1976:3  0.173  -0.358  1.761  -0.191  0.403  0.022 
1976:4  0.229  -  0.262  0.440  -0.419  0.194  0.042 
1977:1  0.026  -  0.585  -  0.759  -  1.233  -  0.022  -0.121 
1977:2  1.238  0.406  -0.079  -0.016  -  0.211  -  0.287 
1977:3  1.485  0.183  0.027  -0.181  0.081  -0.021 
1977:4  1.133  0.097  0.252  -  0.058  -  0.033  -0.083 
1978:1  0.271  -  0.532  0.321  -  0.192  0.194  0.079 
1978:2  0.549  -0.180  1.393  0.519  0.665  0.663 
1978:3  0.281  -0.270  2.453  0.759  -  0.325  0.079 
1978:4  0.369  -  0.184  1.869  0.245  0.096  0.129 
1979:1  0.059  -  0.221  0.506  -0.448  0.227  0.235 
1979:2  -0.270  -0.584  0.754  0.573  -0.016  0.139 
1979:3  0.316  0.230  0.313  0.020  0.041  0.079 
1979:4  -  0.732  -  0.716  -  0.064  -0.007  0.128  0.065 
1980:1  -0.449  -0.290  -0.019  0.229  0.310  0.326 
1980:2  -  1.910  -  1.598  0.242  0.170  -0.312  0.020 
1980:3  0.573  0.945  1.367  0.440  0.015  0.145 
1980:4  0.370  0.364  1.584  0.278  -  0.108  -0.027 
1981:1  -0.162  0.191  0.695  0.828  -0.194  -0.153 
1981:2  -0.949  -0.258  0.655  1.031  -0.234  -0.295 
1981:3  0.492  1.132  -0.081  0.207  0.056  0.034 
1981:4  -0.666  -0.095  -  0.356  0.332  -  0.194  -0.056 
1982:1  -  0.804  -0.207  -  0.284  -  0.358  -  0.366  -  0.268 
1982:2  -0.133  0.373  -0.727  -0.078  -0.360  -  0.368 Alan S. Blinder and Angus Deaton  511 
Table A-1.  Income, Wealth, and Inflation, 1954-84  (Continued) 
Percent 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Change  Unantici-  Change  Unantici-  Change  Unantici- 
in log  pated  in log  pated  in  pated 
income  income  wealth  wealth  inflation  inflation 
1982:3  0.398  0.302  -1.093  -  1.003  0.506  0.516 
1982:4  0.777  0.113  1.893  0.635  - 0.515  -0.004 
1983:1  0.302  -0.712  2.764  0.148  -0.422  -0.400 
1983:2  0.818  -0.256  1.708  -0.569  0.445  0.290 
1983:3  1.352  -0.000  1.614  -  0.132  -  0.088  0.052 
1983:4  1.708  0.470  1.077  -  0.165  -  0.335  -  0.265 
1984:1  1.474  0.421  -0.150  -0.747  0.353  0.158 
1984:2  0.773  0.069  -  0.160  0.035  -  0.386  -  0.316 
1984:3  0.055  - 0.483  - 0.724  - 0.452  0.527  0.296 
1984:4  0.529  0.156  0.734  0.558  -0.440  -0.118 Comments 
and Discussion 
Robert E. Hall: Alan Blinder  and Angus Deaton make a brave assault 
on some of the major outstanding  issues in aggregate consumption. 
Unhappily, the data do not always yield up definitive  answers to the 
questions the authors pose.  But their efforts convince me that no 
additional  econometric  wizardry  will get the answers out of U.S. time 
series data  on major  categories  of consumption. 
One  of the questions  investigated  by Blinder  and  Deaton  has received 
a great deal of attention already, most notably in work by Marjorie 
Flavin.' Can the first difference of consumption  be predicted, or is it 
purely  a measure  of the consumer's  reaction  to new, inherently  unpre- 
dictable  information?  Blinder  and  Deaton  replicate  Flavin's finding  that 
the change in consumption  is predictable  from past income. In their 
equation 2.1, from table 2, lagged income and the forecast of current 
income  based on lagged  information  are  both significant,  contrary  to the 
implications  of a simple rational expectations model. However, in a 
more  elaborate  rational  expectations  model, expressed in equation  3.3, 
from  table  3, with  interest  rates  and  relative  prices, the predictive  power 
of lagged income and wealth disappears.  Flavin's rejection  of rational 
expectations may be an artifact of her neglect of predictors  that are 
consistent  with rational  expectations. However, Blinder  and Deaton do 
not pursue  this finding  any further. 
Blinder  and Deaton are concerned  with another  hypothesis  they call 
"no decomposition."  Under  it, the influence  of the surprise  component 
of, say, income  is the same  as the influence  of the predictable  component. 
1.  Marjorie A.  Flavin,  "The Adjustment of Consumption  to Changing Expectations 
about Future Income,"Journal  of Poiitical  Economy,  vol.  89 (October  1981), pp. 974- 
1009. 
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In that  case, income itself is the proper  variable,  and the decomposition 
into  surprise  and  predicted  components  is irrelevant.  Blinder  and  Deaton 
are  extremely  unclear  as to why  we should  be interested  in  the  hypothesis. 
Theyjustify  testing  the hypothesis  on the grounds  that  "the PIH  suggests 
so strongly  that  anticipated  and  unanticipated  income  and  wealth  should 
get different  coefficients." However, they acknowledge in a footnote 
that "under  some circumstances,  the pure PIH is fully consistent with 
our no-surprise  specification." In other words, sometimes a rational 
expectations model satisfies the no decomposition hypothesis, and 
sometimes  it does not, depending  on issues that have nothing  to do with 
rational  expectations. The paper is devoid of any analysis supporting 
the proposition that rational expectations, or any other interesting 
proposition,  is related to the no decomposition  hypothesis. The work 
that I have done suggests that no interest attaches to the no decompo- 
sition hypothesis. I think the paper should stick to testing hypotheses 
that  have been carefully  derived  from  theory, such as the surprises-only 
hypothesis. 
The role of interest  rates in the consumption  function  has received a 
good deal of attention recently, both within and outside the rational 
expectations framework. Blinder and Deaton find slightly negative 
coefficients,  but cannot  reject  the hypothesis  of no effect. The finding  is 
confused somewhat  by the strong negative effect of expected inflation 
on consumption. Plainly, expected inflation  is not playing the role of 
making  only the real rate of interest affect consumption. Blinder and 
Deaton attribute  the negative role of inflation  to consumer confusion 
regarding  real and nominal  changes. I think they should also consider 
the proposition  that  inflation  is a specific  symptom  of unfavorable  events 
in the U.S. economy. Over  their  sample  period  the two biggest  bursts  of 
inflation occurred following oil price shocks. Their results say that 
consumers react more strongly to an oil shock than they do to other 
events with the same impact  on real  income and real wealth. 
When  Blinder  and Deaton turn  their  attention  to the important  issue 
of the effect of temporary  tax measures  on consumption,  they are again 
unable  to coax a definite  answer  out of the data. A temporary  tax cut has 
virtually  no immediate  effect  on consumption,  as predicted  by permanent 
income-rational  expectations  theory, but the effect in the long run  is for 
consumption  to fall, which is inconsistent  with any theory. Blinder  and 
Deaton  also make  an  ingenious  analysis  of the phased-in  tax cuts adopted 514  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
in 1981.  Their  results suggest that consumers  waited  until  the cuts went 
into effect to start spending  them. This finding  is consistent either with 
a simple  view that  consumers  respond,  irrationally,  only to their  current 
disposable income, or with the view that consumers are rationally 
skeptical  about  the likelihood  of promised  future  cuts. 
The  last major  topic  is the Barro  equivalence  hypothesis,  which  states 
that  consumers  hold back  during  periods  of budget  deficits  because they 
know they will have to pay extra taxes later to support  the resulting 
government  debt. Blinder  and Deaton set up the test in a way that  looks 
separately at an adjustment  to income (subtracting  the deficit from 
income)  and  an adjustment  to wealth  (subtracting  government  debt  from 
total wealth). They find that consumers do seem to use the income 
adjustment;  deficits  do reduce  consumption  via this  channel.  This  finding 
is puzzling in light of table 1, which shows that private saving has not 
risen substantially  during  the period of huge deficits starting  in 1982. 
Part  of the answer  comes from  their  other  finding  that  consumers  do not 
ignore government debt in calculating their wealth, as they should 
according  to Barro.  Taken  together,  the net effect of an increase in the 
deficit working on consumption through both the labor income and 
wealth  (nonlabor  income)  channels  is to increase  consumption. 
R. GlennHubbard: Reverencefor  "psychological  laws" notwithstand- 
ing, the regularity  of the relationship  between consumption  and income 
must surely  strike  us as a conundrum.  Exploration  of this relationship- 
that is, of the time series behavior  of aggregate  consumption-has been 
a focus  of  macroeconomic research for decades. In recent years, 
theoretical  and empirical  efforts have pursued  two related avenues of 
inquiry. One is  the extent to  which "consumption functions" are 
consistent  with the predictions  of the life-cycle model  or the permanent 
income hypothesis. The other is the "effectiveness" of fiscal policy 
changes  in raising  or lowering  consumption. 
Blinder  and Deaton have given us a careful  and innovative  reexami- 
nation of both issues. The paper presents a systematic evaluation of 
recent empirical  propositions  regarding  consumption  models or, more 
correctly, models of consumer spending  on nondurables  and services. 
By addressing  a large  set of variables  potentially  affecting  consumption, 
their study offers a rich comparison  with previous studies. Two issues 
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only unanticipated  income changes matter,  and the hypothesis associ- 
ated with Barro  that individuals  pierce the veil of government  finance. 
My focus is on those two issues and, more generally,  on the relevance 
of various  modeling  strategies  for policy analysis. 
Blinder  and  Deaton  begin  with  a flexible  functional  form  for  estimation 
and  analysis  in equation  1. The choice is a convenient  one, as the model 
nests many alternative  hypotheses, and as is pointed out, the steady- 
state value of the average  propensity  to consume can be solved for to 
test whether  the results are sensible. The paper's  reference  to an error- 
correction  model  raises the questions  of what  factors  are motivating  the 
adjustment  process and  whether  such  a process of adjustment  might  also 
be influenced  by transitory  unemployment  or liquidity  constraints.  For 
example, equation 1 is consistent with an error-correction  model in 
which agents adjust toward a desired consumption-income  ratio, as 
opposed to a desired  consumption  level. As an empirical  matter,  based 
on the estimates  in table  2, the speed of adjustment  of the consumption- 
income  ratio  toward  its desired  level is quite slow. 
The results in table 2 are an informative  expansion of "traditional" 
consumption  functions. The addition  of household net worth variables 
improves  the fit of the regression, as one would expect. What  concept 
of "net worth"  to use here  is a tricky  question.  For example,  should  one 
use only financial  net  worth?  More  important,  what  should  be done  about 
household claims to social security and private pension benefits?  The 
former is unfunded, and the latter is not, but both clearly dominate 
household  wealth. The issue is important  in trying  to disentangle  effects 
of "news about future wealth" from those of changes in liquidity. A 
(log)  wealth-income  ratio  variable  could reflect  either  a scale parameter 
for ln (CIY) or "precautionary"  saving against  future  events leading  to 
liquidity  constraints  on consumption.  Its expected effect is unclear. 
A time  trend  is also included  when  the household  wealth  variables  are 
introduced;  I am not sure of its interpretation  in equations  2.3 and 2.4. 
It is true that C here is not total consumer expenditures and that 
component  parts  might  exhibit "trends"  if income and  wealth  were the 
only explanatory  variables.  However, the inclusion  of relative  prices  of, 
say, durable  and  nondurable  goods should  mitigate  that  problem.  When 
this adjustment  is made, in table 3, the time trend is still generally 
statistically  significant.  One can imagine  other "trend" influences on 
consumption  relative  to income (for  example, the increasing  generosity 
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Perhaps  most interesting  in table  2 are  the results  for models  including 
labor  income, the concept suggested  by the life-cycle model. This first 
set of results  illustrates  that  only actual  variables,  not their  division  into 
anticipated  and unanticipated  components, matter.  Even in this simple 
case, however,  one caveat  is that  consumers'  expectations  about  income 
or net worth  positions  may  be substantially  more  informed  than  those of 
the econometrician,  so that  part  of the difference  between "actual"  and 
"expected" variables  is not really  unexpected.  The larger  is that source 
of "error"  relative  to the "true" forecast error,  the more  likely are the 
estimates  to give the result  that "only actual  variables  matter." 
The addition  of relative  price effects, both intertemporal  and across 
categories of consumption, in table 3 brings still more novel, and 
sometimes  puzzling,  findings.  Nominal  after-tax  interest  rates exert the 
predicted  negative effect on consumption,  though the coefficient esti- 
mate is statistically  insignificant.  That the expected inflation  variable 
does not have the positive sign required by a  "real interest rate" 
explanation  could  reflect  a relative  shift  to spending  on durables  in times 
of inflation.  Based on the results in equations 3.3 and 3.4, the "price 
confusion  effect" noted by the authors  is suspect, given the importance 
of anticipated  inflation  relative to unanticipated  inflation. It is more 
likely that effects of recurrent  episodes of inflation  on consumption 
reflect the importance  of the structural  demand and supply variables 
underlying  inflationary  periods. 
Inclusion  of relative  prices  of durable  and  nondurable  goods gives the 
expected effects and improves  the fit of the model. In addition,  both the 
hypotheses that "only actual variables matter" and "only surprises 
matter"  can be rejected.  The finding  that nominal  interest  sensitivity  of 
spending  on services exceeds that of spending  on nondurable  goods is 
indeed unusual.  That services are relatively  more complementary  with 
durable  goods seems unlikely. The results on the interest sensitivity of 
consumer  spending  do not shed much  additional  light  on the debate  over 
the sign and magnitude  of the interest  elasticity of saving. In addition  to 
the problems  of carrying  out such an analysis  with aggregate  time series 
data, theory tells us that there can be no one "interest elasticity of 
saving";  results  are specific  to the individual  thought  experiment. 
Perhaps  most important  for the application  of the aggregate  consump- 
tion  function  to policy analysis  is the issue of its ability  to assess whether 
households internalize the  saving decisions made for them by the Alan S. Blinder and Angus Deaton  517 
corporate  and  government  sectors. An  obvious  starting  point  for  research 
is to test for differences in consumer responses to temporary and 
permanent  tax changes. The Blinder-Deaton  paper  follows up Blinder's 
important  earlier  study and presents, among  other  things, an early look 
at the effects of the 1981  Economic  Recovery  Tax  Act.  ' While  the results 
are not precise, it appears that scheduled tax reductions during the 
Reagan  period were ignored by individuals.  That is, individuals  con- 
sumed  according  to actual  after-tax  incomes rather  than  the permanent 
after-tax  incomes they would have once the tax reductions  were fully 
effective. The estimates given in this paper  for temporary  tax changes 
in the pre-Reagan  period  differ  from  those in Blinder's  previous study; 
here, the short-run  effects of temporary  taxes correspond  more closely 
to those predicted  by the permanent  income hypothesis. 
The  authors  do not  consider  whether  individuals  "pierce  the  corporate 
veil.  " Nor  do  they question  whether  individuals  pierce  their  own veil,that 
is, the extent to which  household  net worth  held in private  pensions, or, 
for that  matter,  social security  claims, acts like nonpension  wealth  in its 
effect on consumption.  In other words, is household net worth held in 
private  pensions substitutable  for nonpension  net worth? 
Most significant  for the policy debate  over Ricardian  equivalence  and 
the government  debt, Blinder  and Deaton  examine  whether  households 
distinguish  between  debt  and  taxes in government  finance.  The  literature 
gives many  reasons  why the Barro  hypothesis  might  not be borne  out by 
the data:  unlike  the stylized model of Ricardian  equivalence,  tax policy 
is not carried  out on a lump-sum  basis; bequests may be at a corner 
solution for many if not most consumers; in the presence of capital- 
market  imperfections,  binding  liquidity  constraints  on many  individuals 
may restrict consumption movements. The last explanation seems 
particularly  relevant  here, given some of the other  evidence  in the paper. 
The authors  do find evidence for discounting  of future tax liabilities, 
though it is not supported  by the wealth coefficients in table 7. The 
estimates  are not precise enough  to draw  specific conclusions. Despite 
their  rejection  of the strict  requirements  of the Barro  model, Blinder  and 
Deaton find evidence for short-term  smoothing,  evidence required  for 
even a pragmatic  belief in life-cycle or permanent  income models. 
1. Alan  S. Blinder,  "Temporary  Income  Taxes and  Consumer  Spending,"  Jouirnal of 
Political Economy, vol. 89 (February  1981),  pp. 26-53. 518  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
A more direct way to contrast the Barro model and the life-cycle 
model with time series data is to test whether  consumption  varies with 
the age distribution  of resources. Unlike  the life-cycle model, the Barro 
model predicts that consumption is a function only of collective re- 
sources, not of the age distribution  of resources. Data on the age 
distribution  of property  and  labor  income  are available,  and  one can test 
whether  "income share"  variables  matter  in the consumption  equation. 
As tax policies frequently  redistribute  income and wealth along these 
lines, this is likely to be a fertile area  for applied  research.  In addition, 
such tests are likely to be important  in the continuing  debate over the 
influence  of intergenerational  debt policy on consumption. 
Where  do we go from  here? By now, two puzzles figure  prominently 
in recent  applied  research  on consumption.  First, given the professional 
consensus on the modeling  paradigm  for the life-cycle and permanent 
income hypotheses, why do versions of  "traditional"  consumption 
functions seem to fit the data well? Second, why is it that estimates of 
aggregate  saving  generated  from  theoretically  believable  life-cycle con- 
sumption  simulation  models  fall short  of "realistic"  values?2 
I suspect that these puzzles, though revealed in different  research 
agendas,  are related.  Two modifications  of existing  work  are suggested. 
First, we need to consider more explicitly how restrictions  on private 
trades-specifically,  borrowing  restrictions, or liquidity  constraints- 
affect  consumer  spending,  particularly  in extensions  to models  of spend- 
ing on durables.  For example,  life-cycle microsimulation  models  can be 
used to examine  the sensitivity  of aggregate  consumption  and  the capital 
stock to liquidity  constraints,  helping  us to see whether  likely  effects are 
sizable enough to explain the "anomalies" in aggregate  consumption 
functions. Second, households most certainly  engage in precautionary 
saving-against uncertainty  over earnings,  health,  length  of life, and so 
forth. Dynamic life-cycle simulation  models may be able to shed light 
here as well. To the extent that precautionary  motives in response to 
individual-specific  uncertainty are important, it may be difficult to 
rationalize  results of aggregate  consumption  functions  with aggregated 
2.  See, for example,  Laurence J. Kotlikoff and Lawrence H. Summers, "The Role of 
Intergenerational  Transfers  in Aggregate  Capital Accumulation,"  Journal  of Political 
Economy, vol. 89 (August 1981), pp. 706-32; and R. Glenn Hubbard and Kenneth L. Judd, 
"Social  Security  and Individual Welfare: Precautionary Saving,  Liquidity Constraints, 
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results of simulation  models of individual  behavior. These two qualifi- 
cations  of the basic model-restrictions on borrowing  and  precautionary 
saving-are certainly  related. 
The Blinder-Deaton  paper  is an important  integration  of various  lines 
of inquiry  in aggregate  time  series studies  of consumption.  New research 
on issues involved  in linking  solutions  to individual  optimizing  problems 
to aggregate  data (in particular,  the modeling  of liquidity  constraints) 
will be an important  step in extending  their  work. 
General Discussion 
Franco Modigliani questioned Alan Blinder and Angus Deaton's 
exclusion of durable  goods services from their consumption  measure; 
he argued  that they ought to have imputed  rental  values to the services 
of durable  goods and  included  those imputed  values  along  with  purchases 
of nondurables  and services in total consumption.  Blinder  defended  the 
consumption  measure  chosen, noting  that durable  goods services may 
not be perfect  substitutes  for other  forms  of consumption,  as would  have 
to be assumed  to simply  add them to the total, and that the dynamics  of 
durable goods purchases are likely to differ considerably from the 
dynamics  of other  consumption  purchases. 
There was general discussion of whether significant  "anticipated" 
right-hand  side variables  are inconsistent with a model in which con- 
sumption  depends only on permanent  income, itself a random  walk. 
Christopher  Sims observed that one explanation  sometimes given for 
the significance  of anticipated  variables  is the presence of "transitory 
consumption."  But either transitory  consumption  reflects information 
available  to consumers  but not available  to economists modeling  their 
behavior-in which case changes in it should  not be serially  correlated 
so that  its presence  cannot  explain  significant  coefficients  on anticipated 
variables-or it reflects an inadequacy  of the theory-in  which case it 
could be  serially correlated, but no longer satisfies the identifying 
assumptions  of the random  walk model. In this last case, simultaneous 
equation  methods  are necessary to test the theory. 
Sims also urged  that more  careful  attention  be given to time aggrega- 
tion issues, which are critical if one is testing dynamic propositions 
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rational  expectations  theory  can  look quite  different  when  they are  based 
on data  aggregated  over two or three  time  periods,  as when  monthly  data 
are aggregated  into quarters,  than  they do when they are based on data 
for single periods. Stephen Goldfeld noted that shifts in the age and 
income distribution  of the population  could introduce errors into the 
aggregate  consumption  functions  Blinder  and  Deaton estimate. 
Stanley  Fischer  commented  that  the  categorization  of income  changes 
as expected or unexpected  depends  critically  upon  the underlying  model 
of expectations. Insofar  as these distinctions  are crucial  to the analysis, 
he urged  that more attention  be paid to the vector autoregressions  that 
produce  the income change  predictions.  He also conjectured  that in the 
future,  economists  will  place  less reliance  on purely  econometric  models 
of expectation  formation  and rely increasingly  on data  from surveys in 
which individuals  are asked directly  about their  expectations. Goldfeld 
noted a conceptual problem that arises whenever aggregate  analyses 
resting upon an assessment of expectations are performed:  there will 
always be some dispersion  in expectations within the population,  and 
there  is no fully satisfactory  rule  for deciding  which  expectations  to use. 
The question  of whether  Blinder  and  Deaton  had  adequately  captured 
expected and  unexpected  changes  also came up in connection  with their 
test  of  the intertemporal  substitution argument. They reached the 
puzzling-if  by now familiar-conclusion that it is nominal  rather  than 
real  interest  rates  that  seem to affect consumption.  Sims  put  forward  his 
view that  the  result  reflects  errors  in the  inflation  prediction  that  underlies 
the distinction  between real and nominal  interest  rates. Standard  tech- 
niques may lead to overly variable  inflation  forecasts; better forecasts 
can be obtained  using  techniques  that shrink  the variation  in the inflation 
forecasts towards zero. If the inflation  forecasts do not vary so much, 
then surprises in the nominal rate of interest turn out to be largely 
surprises  in the real  rate. 
Sims also questioned Blinder and Deaton's treatment  of the Barro 
hypothesis  that  increases  in government  debt are seen by consumers  as 
equivalent  to increases  in their  own indebtedness.  Blinder  and  Deaton's 
test is based on a single equation  that includes government  debt as an 
explanatory variable; however, if there is  a systematic connection 
between  large  deficits  and  other  events that  change  people's  expectations 
about the likely course of future income, results based on this sort of 
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argued  that  responses  to increases  in the government  deficit  will depend 
upon  whether  consumers  expect any accompanying  increase  in govern- 
ment  spending  to be temporary  or  permanent.  An increase  in  government 
spending  that is expected to be temporary  will have a much smaller 
effect on consumption  than  will an equal  increase  that  is expected to be 
permanent. 
George  von Furstenberg  questioned  Blinder  and  Deaton's character- 
ization  of the Reagan  tax package  as a permanent  tax cut combined  with 
a temporary  tax increase. In making  this characterization,  Blinder  and 
Deaton assume a particular  sort of forward-looking  behavior by con- 
sumers estimating their future tax liability; a more sophisticated as- 
sumption  would be that consumers  estimating  their future tax liability 
consider  not only provisions already  written  into the tax code but also 
likely future  changes in the code. In von Furstenberg's  view, the large 
current  federal deficit should lead consumers to expect future federal 
tax increases, even though  they have not yet been written  into law. This 
could  explain  why saving  rates  did not fall following  passage  of the 1981 
tax act. 